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During the last decade, most Andean countries implemented a set of fiscal reforms aimed at 
strengthening public finances, enhance resource allocation and contribute to macroeconomic stability. 
However, despite recent improvements in fiscal performance, public finances remain vulnerable, fiscal 
policies have often been pro-cyclical and debt sustainability continues to be a challenge in the region. 
Although considerable attention has been given to fiscal rules and institutional reform to address some 
these weaknesses, there is a growing effort to try understand the outcomes of fiscal policies from a 
political economy perspective.  
 
Understanding the budget process as the arena where decisions regarding the use of public funds take 
place and society faces constraints and trade-offs regarding the use of its resources is a key ingredient 
to provide useful recommendations for improving public expenditure management in Latin American, 
and ultimately increase the sustainability, efficiency, and representativeness of public expenditures.   
 
This study presents the case of Venezuela. The report describes the main actors (formal and informal) 
involved in the budget-making process, and  presents evidence regarding the main political and 
economic determinants of fiscal performance. It also discusses whether different political and 
institutional arrangements governing the budget process affect incentives for the composition of the 
budget. 
 
This study is part of  “The Political Economy of the Andean Countries” project financed by United 
Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) and coordinated by Fidel Jaramillo, 
Regional Economic Advisor of the Regional Operations Department 3 (RE3),  Ernesto Stein, 
Principal Economist of the Research Department (RES), and Carlos Scartascini, Senior Research   
Economist  (RES).  
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Survey, launched by the OECD and the World Bank with the support of the IADB, and (ii)  other 
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Politics of Policies”, and the Research Network Project “Political Institutions, Policymaking 
Processes, and Policy Outcomes” (PMP).  
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Venezuela, along with other countries in Latin America, suffered a severe fiscal contraction during the 
period 1974-1999. Public spending measured as a share of GDP fell from 35% in 1974 to less than 
24% in 1999, a proportion that is equivalent to the percentages registered in the seventies prior to the 
oil shock of 1973-74. The decline in per-capita terms was even more drastic, equivalent to 23% in the 
decade of the 1990s alone. In contrast, during the period 1999-2004 the public spending grew 
significantly, representing 34% of the GDP in 2004, a level equivalent to the percentage registered 
during the oils shocks of 1970s. 
During the same period the emergence of large fiscal deficits was notable, leading to the rapid 
accumulation of public debt. Venezuela’s debt growth has been one of the highest in Latin America. 
Paradoxically, it increased significantly between two oil booms, rising from 9% of GDP in 1970 to 
more than 30% in 2004. Similarly, since the 1990s debt servicing has appeared as an important 
component of the public budget (around 24 % of total spending). 
In addition, several measures and studies point to important problems in terms of budget outcomes. 
In this regard, there are doubts about the sustainability of public finances and also important issues 
regarding expenditure efficiency in several areas of public action. Moreover, there is evidence that 
fiscal policy lacks flexibility, and using several indicators, the budget process seems to have little 
representativeness. Consequently, the bases of Venezuelan budgets have become encumbered with 
programmes which are unsustainable, non-adaptable, inefficient (they divert resources from high to 
low value uses), inequitable/regressive (they redistribute income from lower to higher income groups), 
and the allocation of resources tend to reflect the preferences of interest groups. 
It is also possible to observe larger changes in the budget composition over time and frequent 
adjustments in the allocations of public expenditure in response to political and economic changes. In 
the first part of 1999, for example, the budget suffered seven different adjustments
2 equivalent to 
1.5% of GDP. Inconsistently, at the same time the government increased spending on salaries within 
the public sector, in universities, and for pensioners by the same amount of 1.5% of GDP.  
These facts give rise to a number of questions: how is it possible to explain such variations in the level 
and composition of the budget across time? Are these changes associated only with variations in the 
main economic variables? What are the political and economic determinants of budget (re) allocations 
and fiscal performance? Who makes budgetary policy in Venezuela? What is the role of different 
actors and institutions in explaining budget outcomes?  
This study seeks to respond to these questions and to provide an analysis based on positive and 
empirical approaches to the budget-making process in Venezuela from 1974 to 2004 in order to 
understand budget expenditure decisions, and to analyse the actors and forces which affect the 
outcome. It will tackle the following tasks: 
•  Analyze the main actors (formal and informal) involved in the budget-making process and explain 
how they shape this process
3. Three different actors will be analysed: the Executive, the Congress, 
and the different economic and political interest groups that influence budget allocations in the 
Executive-Legislative process. 
                                                 
2 These adjustments were made as a consequence of new oil prices which decreased from 15.5 $/b to 9 US$/b. 
3 In a democracy, many individuals and groups are involved in the design and adoption of different public expenditure 
programmes. Debate over which group determines the level and type of public expenditure is commonplace. Elected 
officials, bureaucrats, and interest groups have all been suggested as the primary figures in determining public expenditures.    2
•  Present econometric evidence about the main political and economic determinants of fiscal 
performance. 
•  Discuss whether different political and institutional arrangements governing the budget process 
affect incentives for the composition of the budget, and how this occurs. 
Two studies comprise the main basis over which this study relies for the analysis of the policy making 
process and the budget process in Venezuela. The first and most relevant is the PhD dissertation “The 
Political Economy of the Budget-Making Process in Venezuela, 1974-1999” (Puente, 2005); the 
second, is the study “Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in 
Venezuela”, (Monaldi et al, 2005). 
A large amount of quantitative data is used, covering a period of 30 years (1974-2004). This 
information is utilized to measure changes in specific levels of budget (proposed, approved and 
executed), years, programmes and areas of the budget. This database is also the main resource for 
several econometric exercises. A variety of interviews with policy makers and politicians were 
conducted to explore the role of different actors and the functioning of formal and informal 
procedures in the budget making process. 
It is possible to identify four main findings in this study. Firstly, from the general policymaking as well 
as budget-making perspective, three distinctive sub-periods within the years 1974-2004 were identified 
from both a qualitative as well as quantitative approach, displaying the following main characteristics: 
First period (1974-1988), was mainly characterized by the effects of the first oil boom and displayed a 
period of strong Presidential power within a cooperative system strongly influenced by a corporative 
arrangement in a limited political competitive context. Second period (1989-1999), was marked by the 
decline in oil revenues, and as presidential power weakened Congress’ greater power became evident 
despite the prevailing non-cooperative system and fragmented political context. Third period (1999-
2004), was typified as a period of increased polarization and constitutional reform, which provided the 
basis for a constitutional and informally powerful President with no political competition.  
Secondly, in general the Executive branch is the leading actor in the budget-making process. The 
Executive has a number of bargaining advantages over Congress during the process. However, budget 
allocations are also the product of legislators' pursuit of (re) election and power, as well as the demand 
of interest groups. Thirdly, besides fundamental economic variables, such as oil income, 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes and others; it is found that political variables such as 
electoral year, the power of the Executive vis-à-vis Legislative among others, are important 
determinants of budget (re) allocations and fiscal performance. Fourthly, as has been shown by the 
political economy literature, political institutions affect the 'rules of the game' under which different 
actors interact, by placing constraints on the whole budgetary process and distributing power and 
responsibilities among different actors.  
The study is structured as follows: section I, discusses the theoretical framework, while section II 
describes the political economy of the oil rent model and the budget making in Venezuela. The 
characterization of the budget outcomes are dealt in section III, and sections IV and V analyses the 
features of political institutions, actors and the policy-making process. Section VI provides an 
empirical assessment of the budget amendments in the approval and implementation stages and 
discusses the coefficients of interaction between the executive and legislative. Section VII offers 
econometric evidence about the main determinants of fiscal performance in Venezuela with special 
emphasis on the relative strength of the Executive and the Congress. Finally, some concluding 
remarks are presented. 
   3
I. Theoretical framework  
In addressing the questions presented in this study, the project crosses the boundary between political 
science and economics. As in political science, this research studies collective choice and political 
actors and institutions. It aims to understand how budget decisions are made, and what shapes the 
incentives and constraints of the different actors taking those decisions (Persson & Tabellini, 2000). 
But, as in economics, this study is ultimately interested in the outcomes of budgetary decisions. From 
an economic standpoint, the Venezuelan budget alone determines the allocation of more than a 
quarter of the total economy’s resources, and the combination of debt incurred and taxes collected to 
finance the budget has consequences on interest rates, exchange rates, human capital investments and 
many other areas. On the other hand, it is clear that economic efficiency and equity in budgeting can 
be superseded by what is politically feasible, given that the budget is the result of negotiations between 
different actors, from different groups, parties and ideologies which are often diametrically opposed. 
These factors argue for an investigation of government spending that is broader in scope than what is 
possible in either pure political science or economics. This study uses techniques from both disciplines 
to investigate important aspects of public budgeting. 
In particular, the political institutions approach and the framework in both Scartascini and Olivera 
(2003) and Spiller, Stein, and Tommasi (2003) comprises the theoretical and methodological 
framework used in this study. Political institutions affect budget policy outcomes through their impact 
on the policy-making process by which budget policy is designed, approved and implemented. And 
budget policy is the outcome of complex exchanges among political actors that participate in the 
policy-making process. The features of the budget policies resulting from this process depend on the 
interaction and incentives of the actors involved in policy making and, thus, the actors’ ability to 
achieve cooperative outcomes. Whether the working of the policy-making process facilitates or 
hinders cooperation will depend on some key features of this process. These features, in turn, will 
depend on the political institutions in place, such as the political regime, the electoral rules, as well as 
the rules governing the interactions between the Executive and the legislature, among other things 
(Scartascini & Olivera, 2003; Spiller et al., 2003). 
 
II. The political economy of the oil-rent model and budgeting in Venezuela 
Specialised literature often describes most of the governments of oil countries as ‘rentier states’ since 
they derive a large fraction of their revenues from external rents. Venezuela is an example of this 
model of development par excellence. The state has been the owner and administrator of oil rent and 
in the last three decades accounted for more than 80% of total exports, 90% of total foreign assets 
income and 50% of total fiscal income. At the same time, oil has a clear political dimension. A large 
concentrated rent source in national income can mould a country’s social and political institutions. 
Therefore, it is the contention of this section that it is not possible to understand Venezuela’s budget 
policy without accounting for the deep impact that oil has had in the main areas of its economy, 
political institutions and society. Consequently, this section briefly analyse the political economy of the 
budget-making policy within this oil-exporting nation. It argue that oil has been the single most 
important factor shaping budgetary policy in the country. This section lead to a greater understanding 
of the political economy dynamics discussed in the rest of the study. 
According to Terry Karl (1999), actors in oil states do not behave in the same way they do elsewhere 
because they simply do not have to. When oil is the key source of wealth for a state, this revenue alters 
the framework of decision-making. Oil creates a perverse incentive structure shaping the behaviour of 
actors in the budget-making process. Oil shapes preferences, perceptions, and attitudes and explains, 
in high proportion, why fiscal deficits, high public debts and other disappointing budget outcomes are   4
likely even during a boom. The exploitation of Venezuela’s oil has laid the basis for a rentier state and, 
in general, a rent-seeking society. This has been constructed on a principle of distributing rents where 
the state has maintained the citizens and not the citizens the state. 
In particular, both private sector and government have rested on the dual capacity to extract rents and 
distribute them internally using political criteria as a central mechanism of allocation. Politically 
powerful interest groups attached directly to public spending, such as political elites, bureaucrats, 
public and private sector unions (e.g. CTV and FEDECAMARAS) have systematically tended to 
capture the state. Therefore, oil revenues have fundamentally shaped Venezuelan politics for decades, 
creating a rentier state legitimised by patronage and entrenched constituencies whose continued loyalty 
has been attached directly to state expenditures funded by oil rents. Consequently, governments have 
charged the lowest tax rates in Latin America and supported some of the continent’s highest profits, 
wages, price controls and subsidies.  
There are two specific direct mechanisms through which oil rents can shape budget policy. The first is 
fiscal income: taxation. When governments derive sufficient revenues from the export of oil, they are 
likely to tax their populations less heavily or not at all (Ross, 2001: 332). A second mechanism by 
which oil rents can shape budget policy is through spending: oil wealth may lead to greater and more 
inefficient spending. Oil income has provided Venezuelan governments with budgets that have been 
exceptionally large and unconstrained despite the country’s low internal fiscal income. In turn, and as a 
consequence of these two mechanisms, citizens lack the incentives to demand budgetary transparency 
and accountability from their government. 
In the rentier scenario which prevailed in Venezuela, especially after the first oil boom of 1974, 
politicians were more electable if they promised to provide more public goods and services without 
asking for the raising of taxes to cover their costs. Between 1970 and 1981, public expenditure 
increased by almost 11 percentage points from 16.3% to 27.4% of GDP; this was done almost 
without increasing the tax ratio in the same period. This was possible because of the huge oil fiscal 
income and the large share of the expenditure that was financed by government borrowing. The 
citizens did not perceive the costs of increased spending in many areas or programmes because ‘oil 
paid the bill’. Since the state never had to compel their populations to accept taxes as regular and 
necessary levies on private interests to be used for public purposes, governments never created a clear 
separation between public and private resources, and the relation between spending and taxes was 
very weak. Therefore, in place of augmenting domestic productivity and internal tax income, 
governments sustained oil-subsidised activities whilst avoiding taxation. Thus, oil booms 
institutionalised a budget structure that almost inevitably led to rent-seeking behaviour on the part of 
the state, citizens and society in general. 
In the Latin American context, Venezuela is a significant case for many reasons. Venezuelan 
experience tests the contention that the export of oil contributes to a fiscal pattern that differs 
substantially from other neighbouring countries. In particular, what is distinctive about Venezuela is 
not only the manner in which the country sought additional budgetary funds during the massive oil 
booms of 1974, 1979, 1984, 1990, 1996 and 2003-2004, but also how it used borrowing as a way of 
underwriting an extraordinary level of state expansionism, economic mismanagement, subsidisation 
and rent-seeking behaviour of public and private actors. What is also different is the support granted 
to Venezuela by the international finance community to continue its untenable fiscal patterns far 
beyond any economic rationality because it was a huge oil exporter. Rather than begin a gradual 
adjustment to a new reality, for many years Venezuelan governments were able to continue to rely on 
external debt to finance high levels of public spending. 
The deeply ingrained belief that Venezuela was rich, as a result of many years of growing revenues and 
massive oil booms, undermined any efforts to demonstrate the contrary. Fiscal dependence on oil   5
developed the notion of the wealthy state without budget limits. At the same time, oil revenues, and 
the extraordinary high level of public expenditure that they facilitated, hid the institutional weakness 
and inefficiencies of the public administration for a considerable period. Furthermore, during the 
period governed by Pacto de Punto Fijo4, traditional parties5 used budgetary resources extracted from 
the oil industry as a key element for modifying pay-offs and sustaining political cooperation for many 
years. Various authors have discussed this relation between political institutions, oil and its effects on 
the party systems. Terry Karl (1986) has argued that oil was the economic factor that allowed the 
country to create the modern social conditions required for the formation of a cohesive party system. 
This explains the continuing support for the institutional pact that solidified the democratic transition 
after 1958. According to this argument, without oil there would have been little chance for democracy 
in Venezuela at the time (Monaldi et al., 2004: 10).  
After the oil shocks of the 1970s and the huge income of ‘petro-dollars’, it was a fairly simple process 
to distribute oil revenues through the budget among different ‘rent-seekers’ in Venezuelan society. 
However, as oil rent faded and society became increasingly complex, the distribution process started 
to collapse either for lack of resources, for failure to reach important parts of the population or for the 
evident incapacity of the political parties to deliver. In particular, the decline of oil prices during the 
1980s and the consequent drop in oil fiscal income were the origin of the rentier-state fiscal crisis. 
This decline in the oil fiscal income, sustained for more than two decades, in fact represented the 
demise of the oil-rent model of distribution that had been the basis of political stability for many 
years. Riots, attempted coups, electoral abstention, decay of the traditional political parties, and in 
general, the collapse of the political system have all been the most obvious manifestations of the decay 
of the model. Therefore, it should be no surprise that the decline of the old political and social model 
based on the ‘rent’ distributions through the state coincided with a general decline in oil fiscal income 
during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
III. Characterisation of the budget outcomes  
This section presents different measures related to fiscal performance in terms of sustainability, 
efficiency, adaptability and representativeness of public expenditures.  It shows that several measures 
point to problems of sustainabity of public finances, there are important issues regarding expenditure 
efficiency in several areas of public action, fiscal policy lacks flexibility, and using several indicators, 




Besides showing high volatility due to heavy dependency on oil revenues, fiscal policy in Venezuela 
has shown signs of being unsustainable. Several studies carried out during the mid 90s and the first 
part of the 21
st century, using a wide variety of fiscal sustainability indicators, illustrated that the 
country’s debt cannot be repaid in the future without radical changes in economic and fiscal policy. 
                                                 
4 The process of elite bargaining of the post-1958 democratic transition led to the so-called Punto Fijo pact. This outlined a 
system which excluded ‘extremist’ parties from participating in government and allowed the development of a set of 
institutional designs to enable outstanding problems to be resolved by behind-the-scenes negotiation (Philip, 1999: 362). 
5Venezuela has had one of the most extreme “partyarchies” in the democratic world, manifesting a high degree of party 
dominance in every relevant sphere: nominations, voting procedures, legislative behaviour, penetration of civil society, and 
influence over the media. During a long period of time this “partyarchy” was organised around two major disciplined and 
centralised parties: AD and COPEI. 
   6
Since the 1970s, public debt grew considerably and fiscal deficits have become chronic. For example, 
during the period 1990-2002, the overall fiscal balance of the Non-Financial Consolidated Public 
Sector registered 5 surpluses and 8 deficits, which range from -13.2% of GDP to 7.2% of GDP. In 
addition, total public debt went from 23% of GDP in 1998 to 35% of GDP in 2002, mainly because 
of an important increase in domestic debt. Table 1 shows fiscal deficit and public debt for the studied 
periods.   
 
Table 1 
Debt and Deficit Indicators 
   70s  80s  90s  00-04 
Fiscal Balance* (% of GDP)  -0.3 -3.8 -3.2 -3.7 
Public Debt, total (% of GDP)  18.9 48.8 44.1 33.9 
   Public Debt, internal (% of GDP)  5.5 6.5 6.2  12.1 
   Public Debt, external (% of GDP)  13.4 42.3 37.9 21.8 
* Excludes capital revenues      
Source: Finance Minister 
 
Calculating a simple debt sustainability indicator, the Blanchard index
6, Rios (2003) found that low 
GDP growth and the high cost of public debt were the main causes for the lack of debt sustainability 
in the Venezuelan case. According to his calculations and assumptions, to attain sustainability, the 
government needs to increase the projected fiscal primary balance in 1.4% of GDP. This result is 
susceptible to variations in GDP growth and interest rates. He concluded that policies conducive to 
higher growth and changes in the debt profile could contribute to improving the sustainability of 
public debt.  
These results are confirmed by analysis carried out by the Garcia et al. (1997) the World Bank (2002) 
and the International Monetary Fund (2004).  To further confirm these conclusions and using the data 
collected for the quantitative and econometric analysis done in this study, the methodology suggested 
by Hakkio and Rush
7 (1991) was replied. This exercise was carried out for Venezuela for the period 
1968-2003 and it was found that during the period under study, Venezuelan fiscal policy was on an 
unsustainable path. 
In brief, all the reviewed studies and all the calculations made for this study (using different measures 
and under different assumptions) show that the Venezuelan fiscal accounts are not sustainable in an 
inertial scenario and that the government constantly needs to apply fiscal adjustments in order to meet 
its obligations. To achieve sustainability over the medium and long-run, it is necessary a profound 
revision of the structure of revenues, expenditure and debt, and most importantly, to find mechanisms 




                                                 
6 The Blanchard index measures the consistency of a given mix of fiscal policy by its capability of stabilizing the 
Debt/GDP ratio. In its calculation are taken into account the actual fiscal stance, the path of the fiscal primary balance, 
interest payments and the effects of exogenous factors on the debt stock.     
7 According to them, under a set of assumptions, an econometric measure of fiscal policy sustainability can be obtained by 
finding a stationary path for the first differences of total fiscal income, primary public expenditure and interest payments. 
An implication of this result is that if total fiscal income and expenditures are variables integrated of order one and both 
variables maintain a long run relationship, there exist a co-integration vector for them, and therefore fiscal sustainability 
holds that there is not a co-integration vector between fiscal incomes and public expenditures.   7
Efficiency 
Efficiency of fiscal policy is measured as the capacity of achieving the goals established by the 
government in its different plans through the set of tools available (revenues, expenditures, debt, etc.). 
To assess the performance of the public sector it is also important to analyze how far are the 
authorities´ actions from the best way to deliver public goods and services in terms of costs and 
output. Given the array of public goods and services, the analysis of efficiency is carry out using 
specific examples in the areas of capital and social expenditures. More specifically, the cases of 
infrastructure and education will be presented.  
Venezuela has been known for having one of the best infrastructure networks as compared with the 
rest of Latin America. For example, the country fares well in the region regarding indicators such as 
the extension of highways and roads (95.155 Km. of which 32.300 Km. are paved ways) and the 
number of ports and airports per capita (CONAPRI, 2002). However, investment in infrastructure has 
declined considerably in recent years and lack of maintenance has deteriorated many of the public 
goods and services in this area. According to CONAPRI (2002), investment in infrastructure went 
from a maximum of around 3.5% of GDP in 1977 to close to 0.5% of GDP in 2000. The main 
reasons for this have been the worsening in the economic situation since the eighties and the perverse 
incentives by policy makers and legislators to cut capital expenditures rather than current expenditures 
in crisis and fiscal adjustment times.            
The breakdown between the different economic components of the budget, and particularly between 
current and capital expenditures, allows us to analyze the long-term effects of budget decisions in 
terms of efficiency. A relevant question is: did Venezuelan governments, during the fiscal contraction 
of the last two decades, make the necessary but painful cuts in current spending whilst protecting 
capital spending to promote economic growth and efficiency or did they follow political expediency 
and do the opposite? 
A key trend in the economic classification of budget was a sharp cut in capital expenditures and 
increases in the current expenditures (as percentages of both GDP and total expenditure). In 
particular, the huge increase in current expenditure is a significant indicator of the distorted pattern 
followed by public expenditure in recent years. This increased substantially as a percentage of the 
GDP during the 1970s, going from 12.3% in 1974 to 14.3% in 1980; by 1999 it was 50% higher than 
in 1974 (17.1% of GDP). In contrast, capital spending declined from 7.3% in 1974 to 3.4% of GDP in 
1999. In many years the current expenditures alone surpassed the annual value on oil fiscal income, a 
pattern that became a permanent feature in the second part of the 1980s and throughout the 90s. 
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Table 2 
Classification of Public Expenditures 
(% of GDP) 
1974 1984 1994 2004
Current expenditures 12.32 16.94 16.61 20.40
  Consumption expenditures 6.13 5.63 5.13 5.86
    Wages and salaries 5.15 4.9 4.29 4.67
    Purchases of goods and services 0.98 0.73 0.84 1.19
  Current transfers 5.79 5.63 6.93 10.75
Capital expenditures 7.35 3.32 3.39 5.94
  Direct investment 2.86 1.1 0.59 0.45
  Capital Transfers 4.49 2.22 2.8 5.49
Financial applications 15.49 4.39 2.234 2.80
Total 35.16 24.65 22.234 29.14 
Source: Puente, 2005 
 
Moreover, capital items are in competition with current expenditures, which are regular and recurring. 
Capital expenditures can be delayed, their exact timing is usually not important in the short term; 
current expenditures, by their nature, have to be paid out regularly. Deferring capital-intensive 
projects, such as new public hospitals or motorways, is much easier than laying off public workers or 
delaying debt payments. This response is consistent with the view that political decision-makers 
generally focus on the short run and heavily discount the future. Moreover, considerations of political 
economy suggest that cutting current spending, such as wages and consumption spending is often 
difficult because such spending benefits politically influential interest groups (e.g. public sector 
employees and the army). In the same way, any scope to increase spending following adjustment tends 
to benefit these same groups. In consequence, the relative stagnation or reduction in capital spending 
and investments in Venezuela seems to reflect policy substitution toward politically more important 
transfer payments and other current spending items. As a result of this phenomenon that have 
resulted in insufficient investment in public capital goods, today the Venezuelan economy is less 
efficient and has increasing difficulties to growth and develop.    
 
Another example that illustrates the inefficiency in the use of public resources is found in the 
education sector. Within the total social expenditures, education has received the larger share, reaching 
an average of around 5% of GDP since 2000 from a mean of about 4% of GDP in the 90s. Despite 
high expenditures in education, a study by the World Bank (1999) shows that key indicators such as 
primary enrolment, dropout rates, and coverage of secondary and primary education are below Latin 
American standards. In addition, most of the expenditure is allocated to pay wages, salaries and 
administrative outlays while there are important gaps in the provision of other inputs such as teacher 
training, books and other materials that are an integral part of good education system. Moreover, the 
quality of education remains low, and there are several disparities in the allocation of the resources 
within the sector. For example, there is a bias towards the funding of tertiary education in detriment 
of primary and secondary education.          
 
These cases exemplified that there are serious problems of efficiency and equity in the allocation and 
execution of the Venezuelan budget. Many of the issues described here can be generalized to other 
areas of the public sector action and translate to the budget design and implementation. Clearly, the 
provision of public goods and services is far from attaining the goals set forth by the government and 
contributes little to the improving in the living conditions of Venezuelans.  
   9
Adaptability 
 
To determine how adaptable is the Venezuelan budget, two aspects are taken into account. Firstly, the 
response of fiscal policy to economic cycles could shed light on the capacity of government to 
mitigate GDP contractions or expansions. In general, it is desirable that the government keeps a 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy stance to ease unexpected economic shocks.  Secondly, the main legal and 
political budget rigidities are accounted for to determine what portion of the budget can be used freely 
by the executive.     
 
If a fiscal policy is counter-cyclical, then the government can save in periods of economic boom and 
use the saved funds in times of recessions. For the case of Venezuela, Rios (2003) isolated the fiscal 
accounts from economic cycles and changes in oil prices to obtain a structural fiscal balance. He 
found that even when the main sources of shocks are suppressed from the fiscal accounts they remain 
very volatile, which could be an indication of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy.  To explore the issue further, 
Rios estimated the fiscal impulse
8 and compared it with the gap between current GDP and potential 
GDP
9. He found that when current GDP is above potential GDP, in general, the fiscal impulse is 
positive and when current GDP is below potential GDP, most of the times the fiscal impulse is 
negative. This confirms that fiscal policy in Venezuela is almost always pro-cyclical. Other studies, 
such as Garcia et.al. (1997) and World Bank (2002), obtained similar results. 
 
The second aspect to take into consideration is the share of the budget that can be assigned freely 
once legal requirements and current expenditures that are very difficult to cut (for political or financial 
reasons) such as public employee’s wages and interest payments are subtracted from the budget.  For 
example, in 2003 the budget legal and contractual pre-allocations amounted to 52% of the budget, and 
if wages and salaries for civil servants and allocations for interest payments are added, then the margin 
for fiscal management is even more limited
10.  
 
In conclusion, the evidence presented here shows that the Venezuelan budget lacks adaptability when 
confronted with unexpected changes in economic conditions. This is because most of the time the 
fiscal policy is pro-cyclical and the government exacerbates shocks to economic activity. Moreover, 
budget legal requirements and difficult-to-reduce current expenditures amount for a considerable 
share of total budget, which impairs the government to adjust fiscal policy when facing a changing 




There are several definitions of representativeness of the fiscal policy that can be found in the 
literature. One definition refers to the extent to which the allocation of resources reflects the 
preference of the population at large or of organized interest groups. Another definition relates to the 
planning process by which public resources are allocated. Finally, it can be associated to the regional 
allocation of resources depending upon factors such as population, income and poverty rates. 
 
                                                 
8 The fiscal impulse is derived from the autonomous components of public finances (those independent of the economic 
cycle, commodities prices and interest rates) and is defined as a temporal change in the structural primary balance. 
9 Potential GDP was calculated estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale. It measures 
how much the economy can growth given initial endowments of production factors and neglect economic fluctuations.    
10 See box 1 for additional analysis about budget rigidities in Venezuela.  
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With respect to the first definition, in Venezuela the preferences of the population are canalized 
through the electoral system, although particular interest groups influence resources allocation by 
lobbying at the executive and legislative level. Some regional governments have implemented 
participative budget, and citizens can have a saying in budget matters, especially those that affect their 
communities. However, this practice has been rather limited. In addition, every new government is 
obligated to present at the beginning of its period a national plan, which contains the priorities and 
policies that were promised during the electoral campaign. However, many times this is an exercise of 
a conceptual nature with little participation by civil society or organized groups. Additionally, there is 
not formal evaluation of the implementation of the plan.  
 
In some instances, powerful interest groups can influence the allocation of resources for their benefit. 
Such is the case of universities. One important feature of education expenditure is its concentration 
on higher education. Pre-school and elementary education, which in 1999 accounted for 80.9% of all 
students enrolled in the education systems, received only 11.5% of the total budget for education. For 
its part, higher education accounted for only 12.6% of enrolled students during the same period and 
received as much as 40% of the budget. The high and growing concentration of education 
expenditures over the last two decades has resulted in educational expenditure having a highly 
regressive component. This situation is very difficult to change because universities are a powerful and 
organized interest group. 
 
IV.  Characteristics of political institutions, actors and policymaking process 
Venezuela’s economic dependency on oil has impacted the institutional setting, policy making 
processes and public policy outcomes, especially the budgetary process and its outcomes as the budget 
is one of the main mechanisms through which the oil revenue is distributed. Notwithstanding, changes 
in the economic and oil revenue conditions are not the only explanation for modifications in the 
different stages of the budget process throughout 1974 and 2004. Also, changes in the rules of the 
game and in the functioning of the political institutions have played a significant role in such 
variations. 
Based on the methodological framework in Scartascini and Olivera (2003) and Spiller, Stein, and 
Tommasi (2003), an analysis of the institutional determinants of the political game that affect the 
incentives and constraints of the main political actors with influence over the budget-making process 
will be developed throughout the rest of this study. Monaldi et al (2005) is used as main reference for 
the description of the general institutional arrangements and policymaking process in Venezuela.  
The rules of the political game that influenced the institutional framework in Venezuela varied within 
the 1974-2004 period. Also, political incentives and constraints that affected the political actors, 
influenced the policymaking process and the subsequent policy outcomes present varying trends, and 
in the last two decades public policies in Venezuela can be generally characterized as having very low 
quality. 
To set an analytical framework that adjusts to the distinctiveness of the Venezuelan case, for the 
purpose of this study the period 1974-2004 is separated into three sub-periods (1974-1988, 1989-1998, 
1999-2004), broadly characterised as: 
First Period (1974-1988) - Strong Presidential power within a cooperative system strongly 
influenced by a corporative arrangement in a limited political competitive context.   11
Second Period (1989-1998) - Weakened Presidential power and stronger Congress within a 
non-cooperative system and a fragmented political context. 
Third Period (1999-2004) - Constitutional and informally powerful President with no political 
competition. 
These periods are described and analyzed separately, as well as jointly, in order to develop a better 
knowledge of the dynamics involved in the budget making process. 
 
First Period (1974-1988) 
The institutional framework during the first period (1974-1988) was embedded within the Pact of 
Punto Fijo and the 1961 Constitution. (Monaldi et al, 2004). A constitutionally weak but informally 
powerful president guaranteed the main party leaders veto over major policy changes. High degrees of 
inter-party cooperation, incentives for centralized disciplined parties in the electoral system, 
presidential elections held concurrently with all legislative elections, lack of regional elected officials, 
and lack of expertise of legislators in the decision making process are also other of the fundamental 
institutional foundations of this period.  
This period comprises the last fifteen years of democratic consolidation in Venezuela, and under the 
theoretical perspective of Spiller, Stein and Tommasi (2003), it can be typified as having an 
environment conducive to political cooperation given the participation of few political actors, stable 
actors (repeated play) and low stakes of power. Stability was privileged over flexibility or efficiency and 
a two-party cartel-like political arrangement that had evolved since 1958 between the two major 
parties (AD and Copei), became a scheme that by the end of the period 1974-1988 was exacerbated. 
Minority parties such as MAS were guaranteed access to small prerogatives to maintain them “inside” 
the system, but they did not have major policymaking role. Corporatist´s arrangements were also 
formally incorporated and used as vehicles to channel through interest group concerns. Thus, 
concurrent agreement included the umbrella organization of the labor unions (Confederación de 
Trabajadores de Venezuela – CTV) and business groups (Fedecamaras), as well as the Catholic Church and 
the military. From the key players, the only group explicitly excluded was the communist party (PCV). 
The two main parties (AD and Copei) generally controlled the leadership of Congress, and with some 
few exceptions they also heavily influenced the leading corporatist groups.  Party leaders were quite 
powerful with strong roles: they enjoyed relatively long tenures, almost all of them were members of 
Congress following long legislative careers, had significant control over congressional nominations 
and decided how the party voted in Congress. Such corporatist arrangements permitted the president 
to conduct policy consultation with a reduced number of actors.  The marginal role of legislature in 
the policymaking process was evidenced by the predominance of policy agreements negotiated 
between the president, the national party leaders and the peak corporatist groups, that given the 
disciplined party delegation in the legislature, these agreements, if required, were stamped into law. It 
was common for Congress to delegate legislative authority to the president. 
The favourable oil scenario during part of this period made the distribution of the oil revenues a key 
political element, influencing also the budget making process. The oil booms shaped political 
distortions as the abundance made the executive branch more powerful and the increased stake of 
power triggered deviations from a cooperative behaviour, amplifying incentives for inefficient 
behaviour and corruption.  
The stability, coherence and some building of policy capacities observed before 1974 started to decline 
during 1974-1988. Certain policy processes were unravelled and inefficiency in several areas became   12
too evident. Notwithstanding, a number of key areas, such as the oil industry and the central bank, still 
preserved relative good quality policymaking capacities.  
From the budget-making process perspective, the President had broad and significant powers, which 
combined with a bipartisan political agreement within a corporativist arrangement, resulted in a 
limited number of actors interacting throughout the different stages of the budget process. 
Presidential power was strongly exercised in the allocation of budgetary resources in order to keep 
political cooperation (congressmen reelections and resources geared towards powerful interest 
groups), but eventually it became an unsustainable scheme.  
Finally, it is important to mention that Presidents who wanted to restrain spending and maintain 
budget discipline in the 1970s and during an important part of the 1980s could achieve this goal to the 
extent that they could depend on extensive and disciplined support in Congress. However, these same 
conditions, paradoxically, helped other Presidents accelerate spending. Therefore, the stability of 
institutions and the political system did not necessarily imply budgetary discipline and the Venezuelan 
experience has been a good example of this, in particular during the 1970s and the 1980s.  
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Second Period (1989-1998) 
This second period, in contrast with the preceding, was characterized by multiple actors (subnationals 
actors among many others), high electoral volatility and institutional instability. During this period 
democracy in Venezuela started to deconsolidate and cooperative agreements to decline. The 
previously prevailing political arrangement fractured and leaded to a greater political fragmentation, 
weaker presidential power and stronger Congress influence in policymaking, particularly in the budget 
process. Transaction costs increased and budget outcomes significantly deteriorated. 
Presidential power weakened and the introduction of regional elections in 1989 activated the formal 
federal system that had been historically dormant. The rise of federalism transformed party politics as 
it increased the number of electoral arenas and competition. The non-concurrency between regional 
and presidential elections and the possibility to re-elect governors and mayors gave new regional 
political actors the opportunity to gain independence vis-à-vis the national authorities. Despite the 
modifications in the legislature system in 1993, from a pure proportional representation to a mixed-
member system of personalized proportional representation, the system continued to be globally 
proportional.  In 1993, incentives for political fragmentation grew and the decline in party discipline 
was every time more evident. Thus, institutional and political instability became the norm.  
The presence of many fragmented and polarized actors changed the political scenario, and a volatile 
process evidenced the weakening of cooperation. With varying degrees of formal and informal 
powers, new key actors, such as the military, civil society groups, and regional authorities appeared in 
the political scenario.  
The substantial increase in transaction cost, reflected by the multiplication of relevant policy actors at 
the national and regional level, made it more difficult for political players to credibly commit and to 
reach policy agreement in more informal environments. Paradoxically, despite the increase in political 
players, the legislature played a more significant role during this period. Closer electoral connection of 
legislators to their constituents made legislators more specialized and less disciplined to the party 
leaders and parties that nominated them. Independent legislative groups emerged that were the result 
from the separation of some factions from consolidated political parties. Dependency of national 
political parties on party alliances increased during this period, and incumbent governors could shift 
partners more easily to assure re-election, increasing their independence from their original parties. 
The decline in presidential powers was strongly influenced by the introduction of regional elections, 
and it was evidenced by his loss of control over part of the budget (given the constitutional allotment 
to the regions), and over the discretionary appointment and dismissal of governors. Also, the political 
currency of presidents was reduced by the combination of declining oil fiscal income and market-
oriented reforms, which limited subsidies and reduced rent-seeking opportunities (Villasmil et al., 
2004). A weaker president figure reduced the executive branch influence in the legislative process, very 
evident in the budget-making process. In 1998, with the purpose of reducing the effect that the 
potential landslide-victory by Chavez might have on the legislature, Congress approved the separation 
(for the first time) of the legislative and presidential elections due on that year. Notwithstanding, it 
generated the largest political fragmentation in the history of Venezuela. 
Third Period (1999-2004) 
Hugo Chavez’s revolution and the 1999 new Constitution characterized the third period (1999-2004), 
with a significant effect over the institutional and political landscape: presence of a constitutionally 
powerful president, greater concentration of power, increased stakes of power, weakening of 
accountability, political instability, polarization, acceleration of political confrontation, partisan 
policymaking and weakened political cooperation. Despite greater polarization, power was   14
consolidated within one political party. Many formal and informal powers changed during this period, 
and a decline of civilian control or relevance over the military became one of the most salient features 
after the election of Hugo Chávez.  
Congress power in the budget process declined, and while the Presidential powers were strengthened 
and the Executive branch retook its stronger role over the budget process, compared to the first 
period, this time the President exercised his power within a non competitive political context. 
Governance and institutional quality declined, reflected in many cases by the reversal of several 
reforms implemented during previous administrations, increase in cabinet turnover, and deteriorated 
perception about many public institutions. An example has been the credibility loss experienced by the 
Supreme Court, which contrasts with cases of judicial independence displayed in previous years, such 
as President Pérez’s impeachment in 1992. Similar loss of credibility was experienced by the Central 
Bank and by the National Electoral Council (CNE). 
During the second and third periods (1989-1998 and 1999-2004), the progressive deterioration in the 
quality of public policy features became evident given the increase in volatility, incoherence and 
disinvestment in policy capacities. The success of reforms in specific areas, such as oil opening and 
privatization, and the presence of capable technocratic teams were shortly lived during these periods, 
given political instability and lack of State capacity.  
 
V.  The budget-making process: actors and stages 
 
The main purpose of this study is to understand the budget process in Venezuela emphasizing the role 
of actors with substantial influence over the budget. However, since budget policy may depend on the 
intricacies of the decision-making, it is important to comprehend the whole process of budget 
formation and, in particular, be aware of the structure and operation. The aim of this section is to 
describe the actors involved in the budget-making process, their relation to one another, the formal 
and informal powers they possess and how they tend to exercise them throughout the different stages. 
 
Actors in the budget making process 
Interdependent choices of a plurality of actors with specific capabilities, perceptions, and preferences 
regarding outcomes, are part of any budget-making process, and Venezuela is no exception. It is likely 
that no actor is able to determine the outcome unilaterally, though some might have stronger 
influence or power. Therefore, what plays a crucial role in the end is the “actor constellation” 
11, 
defined as the set of actors that are actually involved in a particular policy interaction – budget process 
in this case- and the level of potential conflict or collaboration that could be present at any given time. 
The multiplicity of actors involved have diverse levels of powers and incentives that can shift over 
time according to changes in political influence as well as to institutional setting and certain rules of 
engagement. 
In the case of Venezuela, there are three main global actors and that will be described and analyzed in 
this section: the Executive, the Legislative, and the set of diverse informal actors - such as interest 
groups that include political parties, among others. Notwithstanding, after the decentralization process 
after 1989, sub-national governments became an influential actor, but not necessarily as important as 
the other three actors mentioned. 
                                                 
11 Scharpf, Fritz W (1997)    15
Within each group, there are subsets of players with varying degrees of formal roles and informal 
powers. Cases like the Judicial branch, which has a formal role in the Evaluation and Control Phase of 
the budget process, displays limited power in real terms and will not be included in this section. 
Executive  
In the broad sense, the influence of the Executive branch includes the power of the President and of 
different institutions of the Executive: Ministry of Planning and Development (CORDIPLAN), the 
Ministry of Finance, the tax office SENIAT, the OCEPRE, budget units of the public sectors offices, 
Central Office of Personnel, and the Central Office of Statistics, among others. Nonetheless, in the 
elaboration of the budget proposal by the Executive, important interactions take place with other 
public sector institutions, such as the Venezuelan Central Bank, and with public sector companies, like 
the oil company –PDVSA- which plays a very influential role in the estimation of oil revenues and oil 
prices in the budget proposal stage. 
 
The President and his Cabinet 
Until 1999, Presidents in Venezuela were elected for a period of 5 years with no immediate reelection 
possibilities, and could run again for office after 10 years from previous presidential term. Two cases 
of presidential second timers in such scheme were experienced in Venezuela, with interesting 
implications as to their power vis-à-vis the Legislative, given the trend of political fragmentation that 
the country started to experience by the end of the 1980s. The first case was in 1989 with the election 
of Carlos Andrés Pérez, who run under his traditional political party AD and was elected with 53% of 
the popular vote
12. Perez survived a coup, but given political fragmentation in the country at the time, 
and even with the control of 48% of the Congress seats by the government party he confronted 
difficulty in passing many topics of his policy agenda – among them budget issues- and was 
impeached in 1992.  
The second case of an ex-president re-election was in 1994, when Rafael Caldera won with a coalition 
group that included his new formed political party, Convergencia, which individually achieved only 
17% of the popular vote and 13% of the seats in Congress
13. His weak legislative situation in terms of 
party support created conditions for greater number of concessions and bargaining processes. The 
increase in active political parties in Congress, particularly during the period 1994-1999, increased the 
negotiating process between Congress and the Executive during the budget-making negotiations, and 
evidenced the weaker stance of the Executive. 
In the budget process, the Executive has the formal power to submit a budget proposal to Congress, 
which -after possibly amendments to the proposed budget- approves it. Thus, the power of the 
government party in Congress becomes an important variable. In general, procedures are crucial, but 
in particular voting procedures, because they establish who has influence on the final budget 
document, as well as when and how. Therefore, the proportion of seats controlled by the government 
party -or coalition group- was essential during the phase of increased number of effective parties in 
Congress (1989-2000). Until 1989, the President – though constitutionally weak- had strong power in 
policy matters, but the evident shift in the distribution of power in the Legislative curtailed and limited 
the President´s influence over many policy issues, particularly over the budget-making process.   
Nonetheless, the Executive branch has the formal power to put a default budget into force in case 
Congress does not approve the proposal. 
                                                 
12 See annex 2 
13 See annex 2 
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As for the Cabinet, besides CORDIPLAN and the Ministry of Finance – who have an active formal 
and informal role in the whole budget process - other ministries also have a formal role, mostly by the 
fact they are required to submit the projects of their ministries that might need external funding. Some 
ministries have greater informal power than others to influence on the budget allocations. The 
informal influence of a certain minister over the Finance Minister or the OCEPRE´s analysts 
regarding the soundness of his budget needs and proposal is an important aspect of the budget-
making process, as it could affects the final allocation or resources among ministries. Additionally, an 
important aspect is that a minister’s possible lack of influence could significantly affect his credibility 
within his ministry and even among his colleagues, affecting his political stance. 
Following the formal procedures, after deliberations at the Economic Cabinet, the President in the 
Council of Ministries has the responsibility to approve the final budget proposal and set any 
unresolved conflicts regarding expenditure allocations that could arise between individual agencies and 
the OCEPRE. Under these conditions, the power of the President in the formulation stage of the 
budget process is also paired by the influence of key ministers, who could display important influence 
due to their specific functional roles, self interested concerns with organizational and political survival, 
growth, reappointment or career advancement.  
The constitutionally and informally stronger figure of the President after 1999, combined with an 
almost hegemonic Congress -represented by the Government political party- has implied an almost 
rubber stamped approval of the Legislative to the Executive budget proposal or changes. 
 
Main Ministries: Finance and Planning 
 
The Ministry of Finance is one of the principal actors in the coordination of the budget-making 
process. CORDIPLAN – the planning ministry- is mainly responsible for preparing the Country 
Development Plan (Plan de la Nación) during the first year of a given administration. The plan 
describes the general guidelines embedded in the budgetary policy.  Given that the necessary 
macroeconomic variables forecasts and systematic strategic use of macro projections underlying the 
budget are the exclusive responsibility of the Executive, the heads of CORDIPLAN and the Ministry 
of Finance team up to estimate such projections. The Ministry of Finance – under which relies the tax 
authority SENIAT- sets the estimates of tax revenues. Until 1999, before the new public finance and 
budget regulations were enacted, it was the responsibility of CORDIPLAN and the Public Credit 
Office of the Ministry of Finance to elaborate the first version of the Law of Indebtness for 
Programmes and Projects (Ley Paraguas), that was used by OCEPRE to set the final budgetary 
spending level in the proposed budget. Since 1999, though CORDIPLAN and Ministry of Finance are 
still responsible for any debt estimation, the process now follows the scheme embedded in the LOAF. 
Even though the Ministry of Finance is formally the central figure in coordinating the budget process, 
during 2002-2003 the Ministry of CORDIPLAN played a more central role in the process
14. Though 
the objective was to use the budget as a medium term planning tool, the political context - based on a 
commanding presidential figure- altered certain dynamics between actors and has made the budget 
more of an accounting tool with a stronger political influence. Given the political agenda, budget 
composition tended to be significantly influenced by the President preferences on social programs and 
other spending requirements rather than on certain analytical criteria for spending efficiency, 
effectiveness and sustainability. As in previous periods, the success of certain ministers in obtaining 
extra funds relied on their influential power, but in this case not as much due to their proximity to the 
                                                 
14 During those years, the Minister of CORDIPLAN was even the Head of the Economic Cabinet, a position formally and 
traditionally assigned to the Minister of Finance.   17
Minister of Finance or the Minister of CORDIPLAN, as it was the case in preceding years, but on 
their proximity to the next upper level in Government: the President. 
 
OCEPRE, Government Agencies and public entities 
 
Government agencies, mainly leaded by the agency head and his budget staff, play an important 
formal role in the budget-making process, as they provide OCEPRE with the preliminary branch 
budget estimates that are to be embedded in the overall government budget proposal. Budget analyst 
in the agencies play a role as communicators of policy priorities and have some discretional powers. 
Close contact between OCEPRE and the agencies aims to provide the budget office with a better 
understanding of the agencies budget needs despite the fact that agencies tend to inflate request and 
OCEPRE follows a practice of request reduction. Thus, OCEPRE head and its analysts with their 
estimates for development policies, level, composition, and orientation of the revenue and 
expenditure, as well as main priorities at sectorial, regional and institutional levels have a strong 
influence over the final budget proposal. None withstanding, OCEPRE has little effective control 
over oil and non-oil revenue projections, as this is closely guarded prerogative of PDVSA and 
SENIAT. 
Among the many responsibilities as budget office OCEPRE: determines the global expenditure levels 
after using the macroeconomic forecasts provided  by CORDIPLAN and the Ministry of Finance; 
holds budget-review sessions during the formulation stage; reviews and consolidates the individual 
entities budgets; sets final allocation decisions; reviews–in coordination with CORDIPLAN- the first 
draft of the Annual Operating Plan and the Exposición de Motivos of the budget submitted to Congress; 
and during the execution stage, it may defer or cancel part of the authority of operating offices if 
revenues fall short of expectations or delays are experienced in spending.   
Legislative 
Among the many responsibilities as budget, office OCEPRE determines the global expenditure levels 
after using the macroeconomic forecasts provided  by CORDIPLAN and the Ministry of Finance, 
holds budget-review sessions during the formulation stage, reviews and consolidates the individual 
entities budgets, sets final allocation decisions, reviews–in coordination with CORDIPLAN- the first 
draft of the Annual Operating Plan and the Exposición de Motivos of the budget submitted to Congress, 
and during the execution stage, it may defer or cancel part of the authority of operating offices if 
revenues fall short of expectations or delays are experienced in spending.   
All the legislative action on the proposed budget starts at the Finance Committee, with the president 
and members of the Committee as powerful actors that may have great influence in the shaping of the 
final budget. Although other committees may have a saying in budget issues regarding their particular 
topics, usually they do not get involved directly in the budget discussion. In an interview, Francisco 
Rodríguez, Director of the OAEF during the Chavez administration, expressed that in fact the 
Finance Committee- in general- took budgetary decisions without consulting thematic committees; 
thus, one of the biggest political negotiations carried out among parties once a new Congress was 
elected was the choice of president and other members of the Finance Committee.  
Congress has the power to change priorities and add or cut public works, but it cannot alter the 
overall spending levels. Also, legislators can object to revenue estimations and macroeconomic 
forecasts, and request to the Executive their review or adjustment. This pattern was more common 
during the second period studied, when Congress had a stronger stance. Supplementary budgets may 
be enacted by the Legislative, and given that these tend to be less carefully scrutinized during   18
legislative debates than the initial budget approved, they are a channel for excessive expenditure and 
budget indiscipline. The excessive use of these powers by Congress and its implications are analyzed in 
more detail in following sections. 
During the first period under study (1974-1988), the Government party had majority in Congress and 
also leaded the presidency of the Finance Committee. Such control, paired with strong party discipline 
evidenced a period of weak Legislative power, and the unity of purpose between the Executive and 
Legislative minimized the “separation of powers” between chambers and the President. Prior to the 
decentralization process in 1989, the Senate had no significant veto power in policymaking, but even 
still after 1989 the power of the Senate was still very weak. In the budget making process the Senate 
would usually ratify – after any necessary debate – the Lower Chamber’s approval of budget.  
From 1989 until 1999 – the second period under study- the political fragmentation in Congress, the 
visible decay of tight party discipline, and an every time weaker link between the government political 
party with majority in Congress and over the Finance Committee, strengthen the role of the 
Legislative, particularly over the budget process and spending composition. After the 1999 
Constitution, the change from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature introduced a new set of formal 
and informal dynamics, which in many cases have been exacerbated by the almost hegemonic control 
of the Government party in Congress and in the Finance Committee. Inter and intra political party 
collaborations varied with a weakening of cooperation among political parties, but greater intra-party 
cooperative behaviour, especially within the government party.  
The intense lobbying activities of congressmen for increases in spending as well as in enlisting 
Executive officials to sponsor the necessary amendments evidence, in many instances, the great level 
of informal power of the Legislative. Congressmen, like spending ministers, could propose 
amendments that benefited their constituents or groups of interest, failing to internalize the budget 
costs associated with these measures. With the elimination of the Senate as the geographical 
representation in the legislature, many congressmen have informally assumed part of the previous 
Senators roles in strengthening links with certain governors and - given the stronger power of the 
Executive- in trying to influence over many spending ministers in order to promote increased 
allocations to certain regional and functional activities that they will eventually ratify during the 
legislative approval stage.    
Interest groups 
Many interest groups looking to protect their “rent” in the budget allocation have diverse degrees of 
power on the composition of the expenditure levels, significantly affecting the inertia and rigidities 
present in the budget allocations. Informal actors, such as government employees and others 
perceiving benefits from the budget, pressure politically for large increases or to avoid reductions of 
resource allocation, adding steam to any political tension or unresolved conflicts at the different stages 
of the budget process.  
There are strong lobby groups in the legislative, and they mostly operate through three large groups: 
the unions, the political groups with general influence and with enough electoral weight – both in 
public elections as from the inside- and political authorities, especially in AD and COPEI during the 
first two periods analyzed, and later on in the MVR.  
Political parties and politicians at large, with their tendency for short term results that could provide 
them with an enhanced political stance, tend to pressure in different stages for the allocation of 
resources to specific projects, sectors or geographic regions of their interest. The use of “additional   19
credit” – analyzed in following section - is many times due to pressures of diverse interest groups and 
their allies within government for application of extra funds to activities that might have been curtailed 
from certain areas during the budget proposal and approval stages. 
An example of an interest group that has also been very influential in the budget process- particularly 
in the budget implementation- is the military sector. The pressure exerted by this group has been 
evident by the great weight of military projects in public credit, with such investments depending 
practically on supplementary budgets and, prior to 1999, also through the Indebtness Law (Ley 
Paraguas). 
 
The Sub-national governments 
In Venezuela - since the decentralization reform in 1989 - sub-national governments became a new 
actor in the overall legislative and budget process, though not as influential as the other mentioned key 
players. The shift from a scheme based on governors “appointed” and freely removed by the 
President (1958 to 1989), to a scheme of “elected” officials (since 1989) increased the significance of 
sub-national governments and reduced their stigma as agents of the Central government. Governor’s 
elections had a profound and unintended effect on the Venezuelan party system, as it diminished 
power of national party leaders of the two traditional political parties - AD and COPEI. Part of their 
increased power - gained by elected governors over time- is that they have become leading contestants 
for presidential elections.  
It has been argued that a constitutional federal structure could be a relevant factor in the role of sub-
national governments, but as mentioned in Monaldi (2005), the relevant factor is not if the 
constitution defines the country as federal, but if the specific institutions (federal or not), and party 
structure, establish incentives and opportunities for the governors to exercise influence in the national 
policymaking process. 
The influence of sub-national governments in Congress, particularly through the Senate, is enhanced 
in the case the districts for elections of Senators and governors are the same – as it is generally the 
case when there is a territorial chamber (Senate), and was the case of Venezuela until 1989- because 
the potential for electoral connection between the governors and senators tends to be higher, 
especially if elections are concurrent. Nonetheless, as expressed in Monaldi (2005), the 1999 
Constitution changed the institutional framework that could promote such connections, as it changed 
the legislature from bicameral to unicameral and limited the possible concurrency of elections
15. 
Venezuela became an exception from the typical characterization of federal countries, in which there 
are two chambers in the legislature in which one of them – generally called Senate- is based on 
territorial representation rather than population
16. 
Once described and analyzed the main actors in the budget process, the description of their links with 
the stages in the following section will provide a more comprehensive outlook to understand the 






                                                 
15 As Presidents have a six year term, congressmen a five year term and governors a four year term. 
16 Monaldi (2005)   20
Stages of the budget-making process 
 
In the budgetary process designated organizations and individuals have defined responsibilities which 
must be carried out within a given timetable. In Venezuela, this process is established and controlled 
by the legal framework (the Constitution, the Organic Budget Law, special laws and legislative process 
rules). The budget process can be divided into four stages that involve several activities, negotiations 
and actors: an Executive planning stage, a Congressional approval stage, an Executive implementation 
stage and the evaluation and control stage (table 4). In order to understand the mechanism of the 
budget process and the scope for a change in budgetary procedures, it is important to take all four 
stages into account, and in particular the set of incentives and constraints the different actors
17 are 
subject to at each stage (Milesi-Ferreti, 1996: 8). 
 
 




•  Formulation of budget targets and guidelines 
•  Preparation of budget bids 
•  Compilation of budget draft 
•  Reconciliation 
•  Finalization of budget proposal 
 
Approval Stage 
•  Debate, amendment of, and vote on budget proposal 
•  Reconciliation between upper and lower houses 
•  Approval by government 
 
Implementation Stage 
•  Execution of the budget act 
•  In-year changes of the budget 
 
Evaluation and Control Stage 
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Formulation stage 
 
This stage consists of the drafting of the budget law by the government. It begins several months 
before the relevant fiscal year starts and ends with the submission of a draft budget to Congress. It 
involves the setting of guidelines, bids for budget appropriations from various spending departments, 
ministries and offices, the resolution of conflicts between Executive spending interests, and the 
drafting of the revenue budget. 
 
The formulation of the budget takes between three to five months to complete, and almost all the 
institutions of the Executive participate: OCEPRE, budget units of the public sectors offices, the 
Ministry of Planning and Development (CORDIPLAN), the Ministry of Finance, General Controller, 
Central Office of Personnel, Central Office of Statistics and the Venezuelan Central Bank. The 
process culminates with the budget’s delivery to Congress. However, these institutions’ involvement in 
the Executive budget-making process could be summarised and associated with one of four primary 
‘actors’. These performers, in order of their appearance, are the heads of government agencies, 
OCEPRE, the President and Congress.  
The inception of the budget starts with the development of a Previous Budgetary Policy. It defines the 
orientations, priorities, norms and procedures to which all the institutions of the public sector should 
adjust. There are two practical and parallel ways in which to scrutinise the tasks of formulation of the 
Previous Budgetary Policy (AVPP, 1995: 206). One of them consists in the preparation of a 
preliminary budget made by each public institution for its presentation to the OCEPRE. The agency 
head and his budget staff, with all of the branch budget estimates in hand, attempt to co-ordinate 
these parts in order to form the first rough budget estimates for the entire agency. This method has 
the advantage of knowing in precise form the aspirations and necessities of the different offices. 
However, that same advantage becomes a disadvantage, because the aspirations of the institutions 
normally exceed the financial possibilities, which later force governments to make substantial 
reductions. These reductions by virtue of not being framed inside a global orientation of the budgetary 
policy lack coherence.  
The second and parallel form of defining the Previous Budgetary Policy consists in OCEPRE giving 
bureau chiefs a rough target estimate of what they can expect in their total budget. On the basis of 
these target figures, agency administrators develop expenditures estimates of sub-programme 
categories to remain within overall budget constraints. These budget estimates are then submitted by 
bureaus chiefs to departments or ministries heads and, final allocation decisions are made by 
OCEPRE.  
At the beginning of the budgetary process it is also necessary to forecast some macroeconomic 
variables. The macroeconomic projections underlying the budget are the exclusive responsibility of the 
Executive, including that for oil revenue, which normally accounts for more than half of the total 
fiscal income. Based on the macroeconomic projections made by CORDIPLAN and Ministry of 
Finance, the OCEPRE determines the global level of expenditure that ‘should’ be afforded without 
adverse macroeconomic implications, given the expected revenues and the level of deficit that can be 
safely financed. However, there is evidence that in practice governments have developed a systematic 
strategic use of macroeconomic forecasts, which mostly respond to a set of different political and 
economic incentives given the existing conditions at the time. The significant deviations (both 
upwards and downwards) from the prevailing ranges of such variables could not only be explained by 
the argument of miscalculations. This perception of a strategic use of forecasts is normally confirmed 
ex-post budget approval, when the actual impact and implications become evident in the execution 
stage. For example, regarding of oil price projections, there have been cases of over or under 
estimation, such as in the years 1998 and 2004 (table 5). In 1998, given the low level of oil prices the   22
over estimation of the Venezuelan oil basket responded more to the implicit fact that the government 
was trying to reduce the gap between fiscal income and expenditures. As for 2004, in the context of a 
very high oil prices the under estimation of oil basket evidenced the Executive's strategy of reducing 
the level of projected fiscal income as to channel the real income difference through processes that 
usually allow for a more discretionary use of such extra funds (e.g. supplementary budgets).  
Equally, during the period 1994 - 2004 in the majority of cases economic growth has been 
systematically exaggerated, inflation underestimated and, with the exception of periods under 
exchange rate control, the projected exchange rate has been consistently below the real rate.  
 
 


































Revenues   
real
1994 26,0 70,8 170 15,00 1.330.913 1.676.700        
1995 0,00 4,00 20,0 56,6 180,00 290,00 12,00 14,71 2.369.798 2.452.588
1996 2,00 -0,20 28,0 103,2 465,00 476,50 13,50 13,50 3.440.264 6.766.585
1997 4,00 6,40 25,3 37,6 472,00 504,25 14,00 14,00 7.825.655 10.307.001
1998 5,50 0,29 15,0 29,9 546,00 564,50 15,50 10,57 11.243.899 9.971.593
1999 2,80 -5,97 20,0 20,0 638,00 648,25 12,50 16,04 11.742.929 13.063.037
2000 2,20 3,69 17,0 13,4 697,00 699,75 15,00 25,91 17.878.137 20.557.495
2001 4,50 3,39 11,0 12,3 725,00 763,00 20,00 20,21 23.214.303 23.327.869
2002 4,10 -8,90 10,0 31,2 770,00 1401,25 18,50 20,80 26.443.129 26.563.928
2003 3,70 -7,70 28,6 27,1 1.602,00 1600,00 18,00 25,76 41.600.427 38.392.633
2004 6,54 17,9 26,0 19,2 1.920,0 1920,00 20,00 33,1 49.950.884 62.187.407        
Source: Ocepre and BCV. Own calculations. 
For example, the Venezuelan Congress approved the 1998 budget in December 1997 under the 
assumption that there would be: (i) 5.5% economic growth; (ii) US$ 15.50 average oil price; and, (iii) 
15% inflation. These assumptions appeared to be overly optimistic, given that economic growth 
during 1998 was actually an economic contraction of 0.3%, oil prices were only US$ 10.57 and 
inflation was double than forecasted. Similarly, in 2002 macroeconomic forecasts also reflected 
significant under and overestimations relative to real values. The budget approved assumed a 4.1% 
economic growth, US$ 18.50 average oil price and 10% inflation, while the economy experienced an 
8.9% contraction, average oil prices reached US$20.8 and inflation was three times higher reaching 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Revenues estimated Revenues   real
 
Source: Ocepre 
The commonality in all these periods is that politics has accounted for a significant part of the 
problem and the process has not been completely technical and objective. Indeed, the lack of 
transparency and the possibility of manipulation using, in the majority of cases, overly optimistic 
economic projections have allowed political interests to become a factor in the budgetary process. 
In general, these forecasts are not presented with sensitivity or risk analysis, they are not subject to 
public validation, and they usually differ from market expectations. This suggests that governments 
have used forecasts strategically. Besides being used for budget projections, macroeconomic forecasts 
by the government affect the expectations of economic agents. Therefore, a plausible additional 
explanation for this behaviour would take into account the differing goals of the government 
regarding both budgetary and macroeconomic goals and the influence of forecasts on private 
expectations (Abuelafia et al., 2005). 
In many years, and especially in the strong recession years of 2002 and 2003, the government had 
incentives to try to influence expectations by announcing high growth forecasts. In years in which the 
macroeconomic models at CORDIPLAN predicted negative growth, political authorities insisted on 
presenting positive growth forecasts. Furthermore, given the budget restrictions of these years, the 
Executive required high growth and revenue forecasts so as to be able to present a budget without 
proposing spending cuts to Congress. These required cuts could easily be implemented later in the 
budget implementation stage. Hence, both political convenience and economic incentives promoted a 
systematic overestimation of growth in these years. 
Equally, as Figure 1 shows between 1994 and 2004, the forecasts in many years underestimated the 
total revenues of the national government. Total revenues forecasts during 2001 and 2002 were close 
to real, but still underestimated. This general trend was reversed only in 1998 and 2003. Particularly, in 
the year 2003 the total resources were overestimated by around 20% despite lower forecasts of oil 
prices, but the economy experienced a strong economic contraction partially attributed to the lagged   24
effects of the unpredictable national strike at the end of 2002.  In 2004, revenues and average oil 
prices were again underestimated, and though actual inflation was for a second consecutive year below 
than expected, it was one of the few years in which economic growth surpassed expected growth, and 
by a significant difference.  
Moreover, optimistic revenue projections, particularly the non-oil fiscal income, have proved equally 
significant and a key strategic component of the politics behind the budget process. Changes in the 
incentives for under or over estimation of such revenues have been strongly influenced by the overall 
economic context and political environment, and have normally been subject of debate within the 
government.  During the 90´s, in a scenario of low levels of oil prices, the most common trend was 
the overestimation of non-oil fiscal income despite the consistent evidence of a lower collection 
capacity from SENIAT. Among the reasons for such optimistic projections was to show a smaller gap 
between ordinary revenues and expenses, especially given the tendency of Congress to cut the 
budgeted debt level requirements.  
More recently, a new practice has been developed. The government has incentives to be optimistic in 
the forecasting of extraordinary revenues and pessimistic when estimating ordinary revenues. The 
reason for this is that if ordinary revenues are relatively low as compared with extraordinary revenues, 
the government, by law, could transfer fewer resources to local administration given that the transfer 
is a fixed proportion of ordinary revenues.    
 
It is important to note, as was mentioned before, that oil and non-oil revenue projections are 
prerogatives of PDVSA and SENIAT. Therefore, instead of OCEPRE influencing revenues, revenues 
have influenced OCEPRE’s actions. 
 
When the macroeconomic projections and the main limits of socio-economic policies based on the 
forecast of PDVSA and SENIAT are defined, a first draft of the ordinary fiscal income of the budget 
is made. From this income is derived the calculation of the legal assignments. Equally, with this 
information the first estimates (pre-quota) of ministries and other offices of the public administration 
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Box 1. Budget rigidity 
Rigidity of the central government expenditure has been another characteristic of Venezuelan public 
budgets during the last decades. An important proportion of the public spending corresponds to the 
‘Legal Assignments’ which constitute commitments set down in the Constitution and in the legislation 
which earmark many revenues for specific purposes.  
In addition to legal assignments there are another component of rigidity given by salaries and wages 
and debt service. Even though these expenditures are not considered officially legal assignments, they 
are “contractually” and “politically” impossible to reallocate. This imposes a considerable constraint 
on the central government’s overall fiscal effort. Since sub-national governments have not fully used 
their powers to collect taxes, a large share of their revenues (close to 100%) comes from the central 
government, making them dependent on the intergovernmental transfer. In these circumstances, the 
government's discretion to reorient the expending according to public policy priorities is seriously 
limited. 
Aggregation of legal assignments, salaries and wages and debt service are shown in table 1. They 
represent an approximation of the budget rigidity. For example, these expenses reached 55.7% of the 
total revenues in the budget of the year 1999, leaving available to the Executive Bs. 6,445,776 million 
to orchestrate a coherent budget policy connected with the strategic guidelines of the State
18.  
In particular, the Venezuelan system of transfers to the states is mainly composed of the Situado 
Constitucional (Constitutional Fund), the Law of Special Economic Assignments (LAE) and the 
Intergovernmental Fund for the Decentralization (FIDES). The first allocates the Central 
Government's ordinary revenues (according to the law, it should be located between 15 and 20% of 
these revenues excluding the royalties of hydrocarbons). The second redistributes royalties (with a 
minimum of 20% of the central government's revenues) that should be assigned to states in 70% 
where oilfields are located. The third is a pool which is integrated with budgetary contributions. In 
turn, the states should distribute a specific mount of the resources that are received by the 
municipalities. 
It is estimated that about half of sub-national government revenues are oil-related. By the mid 1990s 
an important percentage of the oil revenue (regardless of international prices) had been earmarked for 
transfer to local and regional governments. As explained above, the transfer system tied government 
revenue to sub-national entities through complex rules, creating a national arena for competition over 
rents. Under political pressure, based in part on widespread expectations about future oil revenues, 
governments ignored standards for transfers, and allotted them to states without adequate capacity, 
whilst the transfer of responsibilities to sub-national governments lagged far behind the transfer of 
revenues. Furthermore, earmarking has reduced the budgetary flexibility of the central government, 
                                                 
18 Heavy reliance of states on intergovernmental transfers can create a wedge between local spending and local resources, 
and between benefits of government programmes and the cost to local taxpayers, which may generate moral hazard 
(OECD, 2001:43). In Venezuela, states’ own resources account for no more 2 or 3 % of their total budgets. Moreover, the 
use of transfers reduces accountability in expenditure management at the regional and local level of government, unless the 
transfers are in the form of block grants or involve co-financing. Follow-up and control mechanisms have been developed; 
but states’ administrative and fiscal capacities are uneven and in some states they may be insufficient, which also weakens 
fiscal accountability. Two key questions arise in this context: whether fiscal decentralisation may lead to a deterioration of 
sub-national finances, and whether such an occurrence would affect negatively the budget position of the central 
government. In the event of financial difficulties, the central government would have to bail out sub-national levels of 
government as in the recent cases of Brazil and Argentina.   26
locking in spending increases during oil windfalls and forcing drastic cuts in operating expenditures 
during downswings. 
In the Venezuelan case, the inertia and rigidities of budget allocations can be explained as the direct 
product of high-growth budgeting and the strategy of some groups to protect their ‘rent’ in the next 
budget. In the thirteen years period from 1991 to 2004 expectations of high budget allocations became 
institutionalised in budgetary decision making through the legal assignments (Table 1). Each year new 
programmes were authorised, usually at low initial levels, in the expectation that future resources 
would be sufficient for them to grow. Government employees and those receiving benefits from the 
budget grew accustomed to large annual increases (or at least the same level in real terms), eventually 
coming to see them as a matter of right (for instance, política habitaciona
19 and Situado Constitucional).  
Interest groups and their allies within the government became sensitive to any suggestion that their 
particular policy sectors might be viewed less favourably than others, and stood ready to defend 
themselves against declines in their shares. Thus with time larger proportions of the annual increment 
(especially oil revenues) came to be ‘frozen’ and used up by expenditures which were mandatory. 
 
Table 1. Budget legal pre-allocations 
Legal Pre-Allocations 
Item  Source of Finance 
Situado Constitucional  20% ordinary fiscal income 
Fondo de Prestaciones Sociales  1% ordinary fiscal income 
Rectifications   0.5% - 1% ordinary fiscal income 
I.V.S.S.  1.5% of the total salaries paid by the Public Administration
SENIAT  3% – 4% income administrated by SENIAT 
FIDES  15% - 20% of fiscal income from VAT 
LAE  24% of the Oil Regalia 
Ley de Politica Habitacional  5% Ordinary income discounted Situado Constitucional 
System of Justice  Maximum of 2% of the ordinary fiscal income 
   
















                                                 
19 Means “housing policy”.   27




                    CONCEPTO 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2004
LEGALS AND CONTRACTUALS 344.450 457.910 1.315.598 4.654.602 6.410.018 10.932.879 21.624.394 24.315.979
  .  SITUADO CONSTITUCIONAL 106.217 166.132 434.310 1.777.957 1.852.070 3.166.316 4.890.639 7.488.181
  .  FONDO INTERGUB. PARA LA DESCENT. 0 962 10.528 292.456 473.992 602.872 855.628 1.356.765
  .  ASIGNACIONES ECONOMICAS ESPECIALES 69.533 271.906 587.172 1.120.690 1.774.550
  .  LEY DE POLÍTICA HABITACIONAL 25.751 15.066 86.057 257.151 246.888 521.795 970.914
  .  FONDO DE PRESTACIONES SOCIALES 4.248 8.503 21.310 65.000 56.564 57.949 242.729
  .  F.I.V. 11.500
  .  IVSS 4.275 7.316 8.266 9.919 43.170 73.086 220.872
  .  INCE 571 483 0 0 0 0
  .  SENIAT 0 14.448 32.518 112.000 237.616 368.437
  .  SYSTEM OF JUSTICE 305.897 542.811 748.818
  .  BUDGET RECTIFICATIONS 5.930 5.909
  .  DEBT SERVICE 198.029 241.951 740.196 2.150.069 3.353.427 5.380.177 12.411.674 12.947.665
SALARIES AND WAGES 128.677 203.283 378.603 1.211.401 1.702.023 3.590.441 6.283.752 9.580.552
TOTAL RIGID 473.127 661.193 1.694.201 5.866.003 8.112.041 14.523.320 27.908.146 33.896.531
BUDGET 801.257 1.100.718 2.808.188 10.667.554 14.557.817 28.079.215 41.613.125 60.505.058
TOTAL FLEXIBLE 328.130 439.525 1.113.987 4.801.551 6.445.776 13.555.895 13.704.979 26.608.527




Furthermore, politicians in general have a tendency to worry more about immediate problems than 
long-range considerations. In consequence, they can be tempted to adopt dubious budget devices in 
the short-term. For example, the allocation for the System of Justice, created in the 1990s, would 
inevitably lead to a report calling for more money within the next years or a new agency or 
government office might be approved. Similarly, expenditure hikes might be carefully scheduled. In 
1992 a legal assignment for the Venezuelan Institute of Social Security (Instituto Venezolano de los Seguros 
Sociales, IVSS) was timed to start so that it would cost only 5.550 million bolivars in the first year, but 
thirteen years after this programme it cost 748.818 millions (Table 2). Legal assignments, may also 
seen as an unintended consequence of adaptation to the environment of high expectation from 
specific groups and the necessity to protect their ‘rent’ in future budgets. 
 
 
In parallel with such macroeconomic projections, CORDIPLAN and the Public Credit Office of the 
Ministry of Finance elaborate the first version of the Law of Indebtedness for Programmes and 
Projects (Ley Paraguas)
20, remitting them to OCEPRE in order to incorporate them in the estimates of 
budgetary spending. To do this, the Ministries are required to submit a list of projects that will require 
external funding. Based on the obtained results, a first estimate of budgetary necessities is made and 
their possible financing sources. After this process the document goes for internal and external 
discussions in order to balance the budget. The macroeconomic variables are also revised, obtaining a 
definitive version.  
 
In coordination with CORDIPLAN, OCEPRE revise the first version of the Annual Operating Plan 
and the Exposición de Motivos of the budget. Following this stage, new estimates of the ordinary 
revenues (and their corresponding legal allocations) are carried out and the estimates of pre-quotas 
                                                 
20 From 1999 this process has been rule by the new legal framework (LOAF). For more details see section “Budget-making 
process under the new regulations of 1999.    28
approved are revised. All public institutions are consulted about the programmes and other actions 
that they project to carry out during the budgetary period, which are reflected in their respective 
Institutional Annual Operative Plans (Planes Operativos Anuales Institucionales).  
During this part of the process, the analysts in the OCEPRE hold budget-review sessions, in which 
agency heads, accompanied by their staff, defend their budgets’ structure and size against the probing 
of analysts. The often-excessive first round creates the need for a bargaining process to revise the 
proposed aggregate back downward to a level similar to fiscal income. Such bargaining traditionally 
involves each public agency and ministry in fighting the OCEPRE to reduce cuts in the level of 
spending that the agency propose for itself above and beyond the OCEPRE. This process of 
negotiation and budget rearrangement is necessary to make agency-budget estimates consistent with 
presidential and departmental policy. The major resource of most ministers and head offices is their 
own ability to convince the Finance Minister or the OCEPRE’s analyst of the soundness of his 
agency’s proposal, and the only reliable appeal is to the President. When resorted to, presidential 
interventions with Finance Minister are usually based on prior commitments that the Ministers 
individually extract from the Presidency or on public positions to which the President pledges the 
administration (Bigler, 1976: 4). 
Spending departments tend to press for a larger expenditure whilst OCEPRE urges restraint. 
Spending departments’ attitude is not necessarily discreditable. Officials who are carrying out a 
programme are likely to be keenly aware of further needs and less sensitive than the OCEPRE to 
other demands and limitations on the total fiscal income. Agencies can inflate their request in order to 
leave room for cutbacks. This is where the OCEPRE usually follows the practice of reducing all 
requests, regardless of how well they are supported
21. The result can be highly unrealistic requests and 
arbitrary reductions that negate careful considerations of requirements. In consequence, public offices 
lack the incentive to tell the truth because if they request the ‘necessary’ amount of money they would 
have less than they really need. The outcome is a ‘game’ where budgets are willingly and commonly 
inflated. 
During this part of the process the OCEPRE budget analysts are also in close touch with the agencies. 
A large part of their job entails understanding the agency programme and its budget needs. The 
analysts help to shape the agency budget before it gets to the OCEPRE, to enhance programmes that 
the Executive desires, or the analyst ‘thinks’ are in line with Executive priorities. As it was above 
mentioned, in this stage the OCEPRE’s analysts have some discretional power influence over the final 
budget. 
It is also worth mentioning that some public offices may well have information in hand to justify cuts 
in expenditure. However, there is little incentive to make this information available to OCEPRE. 
Better to absorb their share of the cuts like everyone else than to see their office programme lose 
more than the others. As Aaron Wildavsky (1987) observes: “If a [public office’s] loss is [another 
office’s] gain, why should [it] play this game?” Equally, for managers of the public offices it is vitally 
important to protect the office’s budget. Even ministers are expected to defend the ministries’ money 
allocations in cabinet or in the OCEPRE, otherwise they could loose credibility within the Ministry or 
even his colleagues. By design, then, the Venezuelan budgetary process produces a climate of scarcity 
in which the success of those who participate is measured by the number of bolívares they are able to 
win.  
                                                 
21 At the same time, and in practise, the budget office normally cedes to the public offices the responsibility for detailing 
the manner in which the funds will be spent, while it instead focuses on the overall sum of expenditures that an entity will 
be allowed (Jones, 2001: 159). 
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Another tactic often adopted by public offices when asked to propose economies or reduction in their 
budgets is to suggest the elimination of a specially popular or prominent programme in order to divert 
attention from more vulnerable ones. If, for example, the Ministry of Education is asked how it would 
absorb a budget cut, it may reply that some school would have to be closed, without conceding that 
any savings in administrative or bureaucratic spending could be made.  
In this stage of the budgetary process there is also a strong tendency for public offices to utilise the 
previous year’s budget as a base, normally increasing programme percentages (incremental budget) in 
line with the limits prescribed by OCEPRE. Thus, when preparing their budget requests, ministries 
and other public offices often only add percentage increases, guided by an inflation projection, to their 
previous year's budget.  
Budget allocations, however, are by no means final. Many public agencies have strong linkages to 
Congress and political parties represented there, and are willing to allow the OCEPRE to make cuts, 
in the anticipation that they will ultimately be restored by Congress in the approval stage of the 
budget. 
The report on the budgetary policies that will govern the exercise, and the estimates (pre-definitive) of 
budgetary revenues (ordinary, extraordinary and financing), legal assignments, recommendations of 
ministerial quotas and Indebtedness Law are then presented to the Economic Cabinet for deliberation. 
Later on, they incorporate modifications and present a definitive version of revenues estimates, 
ministerial quotas and budgetary policies to the Council of Ministries for approval. Once approved 
this is remitted officially to the corresponding institutions in such a way that they elaborate its budgets 
and remit to OCEPRE. The OCEPRE then revises and consolidates each budget. Concurrently, the 
final versions of the Exposición de Motivos, the Annual Operating Plan and the Indebtedness Law are 
prepared.   
It is important to note that time constraint is a central factor in explaining regularly inconsistent 
budgets. The reduced time in the formulation of the budget (partially a consequence of overlapping 
phases) and the difficulties of programming for more than one year directly limit the deliberations 
between the budget office, the ministries and public offices. For example, during the preparation of 
the 1997 budget, most ministerial offices had only three days to discuss their proposals (Petrei, 1998: 
319). This is the reason for the final reconciliation of the budget in OCEPRE being popularly known 
as the madrugonazo
22. 
The final version of the budget during the Executive phase is approved by the Council of Ministers 
and submitted to Congress by the Finance Minister at the beginning of the Congressional budget 
session. This draft version of the budget immediately goes to the Finance Committee of the Chamber 
of Deputies, which holds primary responsibility for revenue and expenditure bills. Specifically, Article 
22 of the Organic Budget Law (LORP)
23 which governs the Executive’s budget, specifies that the 
President has to transmit the budget to Congress during the last two weeks of June for the following 







                                                 
22 In other words, OCEPRE officials are going to spend the whole night reconciling the budget just a few hours before its 
submission to Congress.  
23 See box 2 on “Budget-making process under the new regulations of 1999”.    30
Congressional approval stage 
This phase consists of the passage through Congress of the budget law, up to its final approval. In 
particular, with the budget submission, budget responsibility falls on Congress. This body has a 
Constitutional mandate and primary responsibility for matters of government budget, and legislative 
action on the proposed budget begins at the Finance Committee. This committee is organised into 13 
subcommittees, each of which has responsibility for a particular kind of proposed expenditure (AVPP, 
1995: 222). Each subcommittee holds hearings on a portion of the budget for which it is responsible 
and develops an appropriation bill containing its recommendation. These bills are then reported to the 
full committee, which pass them, in some cases making modifications. The full committee, in turn, 
reports the bills to the whole Chamber of Deputies (until 1999 when it was still bicameral), where they 
are approved usually after amendments. 
The Chamber of Deputies must pass the budget before any formal Senate action may be taken. 
However, many Senators informally join the Deputies committee’s deliberations to form an effective 
joint committee. Otherwise, they would have only a few days to debate and decide on the budget. 
Following the passage of the budget by the Deputies, the Senate goes through a similar subcommittee-
committee-full membership process. If the Senate rejects certain proposals, a joint meeting is held. 
During the debate the legislature could change priorities and add or cut public works. With the 
approval of both houses, the appropriations legislation goes to the President for his signature. This 
process must be completed before November 30
th (Article 25 LORP). If Congress does not approve 
the proposal, the Executive branch puts a default budget into force. However, if Congress produces 
an agreement before March 31
st  of the current year, the new budget is then valid. 
The Executive retains an early advantage even as Congress begins the public review of the budget 
proposals. Within the first weeks of submission the Ministry of Finance, OCEPRE’s director, the 
President of PDVSA and the director of SENIAT appear before the Congressional Finance 
Committee. In the majority of cases they have been reported by the press while the Congressional 
questioner has been largely ignored; the press tends to focus on the administration witness and not on 
the legislative interrogators. Legislators may be seen welcoming the ministries and the budget director 
to their committees and subcommittees; nonetheless, the momentum lies with the Executive officials. 
 
Executive implementation stage 
This stage refers to the execution of the budget, which utilises legal spending authority. It includes 
commitments, such as contracts or other obligations for hiring personnel, purchases of goods and 
services, disbursements, and recording and reporting. One aspect of particular importance at this stage 
is how much flexibility there is in the budget to face unforeseen contingencies. This is fundamentally 
related to the possibility of introducing supplementary budgets during the fiscal year and the ability to 
transfer resources between budget chapters, programmes and ministries. According to these criteria, as 
will be detailed later in this document, Venezuela’s budget is very flexible in the practical sense at the 
implementation stage (despite that the formal rules might establish a more rigid procedure 
fundamentally in the formulation stage). In consequence, the budget tends to be subject to important 
changes during its implementation. 
In particular, if revenues fall short of expectations or delays are experienced in spending during the 
budget execution stage, OCEPRE may defer or cancel part of the authority of operating offices. 
Conversely, if government finds that it needs to spend more money than Congress originally allocated 
for the budgetary year, because of circumstances that were ‘not anticipated’ when the budget was 
formulated, additional allocations are enacted. Further funds might be needed in order to provide 
adequate assistance to an area afflicted by varying factors. Under such circumstances, the Legislative   31
may enact supplementary budgets that become a channel for fiscal indiscipline as they are less 
carefully scrutinised in Congress than the initial budget approved. 
An important feature of the budget execution until 1999, is that expenditures committed in a fiscal 
year can be paid in the first semester of the following budgetary year (complementary semester) 
through the remaining credits account, created toward the end of each year (Petrei, 1998: 321). Then, 
the Venezuelan budget has 12 months’ revenue and 18 months’ expenditures which creates all the 
incentives and conditions to spend more than income available. After the new Public Finance Law 
(LOAF), this complementary scheme was eliminated.  
Finally, it must be mentioned that the formal and informal rules of the Venezuelan budget give public 
offices a strong incentive to spend all available resources, even at the expense of efficiency. The 
disincentive to be efficient is summarised in the ‘use it or lose it’ attitude of public offices. Public 
institutions routinely assume that if they do not spend their entire budget, they may be given fewer 
resources the following year because spending units cannot retain unused public funds. Thus, the 
institutional framework in the execution process of the Venezuelan budget creates all the incentives to 




Box 2. Budget-making process under the new regulations of 1999 
The 1999 Constitution established the basis of the new budget-making scheme (Articles 311-315) and 
it incorporated a long term view mainly based on a multi-year scheme (Plurianual), in which ordinary 
incomes must be sufficient to cover ordinary expenses, aimed at reaching fiscal balance during the set 
period and within the macroeconomic and fiscal agreements among government institutions. It is 
stated in the Constitution (Article 313) that from the presentation of the multi-year framework, the 
special indebtness law and the annual budget, the Executive will make explicit long term objectives of 
its fiscal policy´s long and explain how these objectives will be reached within the principles of 
responsibility and fiscal balance. From this foundation, a set of new laws and norms where approved 
since the year 2000.  
In September 2000, the Organic Law of Financial Administration of the Public Sector (Ley Orgánica 
de la Administración Financiera del Sector Público - LOAF) was enacted, incorporating the different 
administrative and financial procedures required for budget-making, public credit, national treasury, 
accounting and internal control that were previously in different laws. From the integrated view 
established in this law, separate normatives were approved for each case. The first normative is related 
to the budget process (Reglamento No1-LOAF), the second to the public credit operations and the 
third for treasury transactions. 
The main innovation in the LOAF was the inclusion of macroeconomic and fiscal rules in order to 
articulate the yearly budget to the long term fiscal targets to guarantee fiscal balance. One of the main 
objectives is that national, regional and local plans be embedded in the public budget. Therefore, the 
formulation stage now includes a set of procedures for each case, expanding the institutional coverage 
of the budget process with differentiating rules applying to the Central Government and its entities, to 
local governments, and to companies in which half or more of its capital is owned by the State or 
public entities. Specific laws established more detail, especially at municipal levels, but all within the 
principles and dispositions determined by the LOAF. 
The link between planning and budget had started in previous years, and even a pilot plan was made 
using the case of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications to show the possible   32
effectiveness of such proposal, but it is not until the new legal framework set by the LOAF that the 
linkage and mandatory execution of planning and budget is made more explicit.  
The new fiscal balance rules for macroeconomic planning established some main conditions, among 
which it includes: a balance or superavit between ordinary revenues and expenses; fiscal adjustments 
needed to meet the balance target must not be concentrated in the last year of the multi-year period; 
the maximum limits defined in the rules for spending and debt must be based on an estimation that 
should incorporate the requirements of fiscal sustainability, size of the economy, reproductive 
investment and fiscal capacity; variations to the spending and debt level established will only be 
approved for exceptional cases; the Executive Branch must present to the National Assembly, before 
July 15 of each year, a report with the evaluation of budgetary executions and explanations for any 
deviations from estimated amounts.  
The complementary semester scheme used under the previous budgetary framework was eliminated, 
thus no new compromises or expenditures are allowed after December 31 of each year. Any spending 
compromised not executed by that time is to be transferred to the next year’s budget.  
With all this in mind, the new laws and normative developed all the operative details for the multi-year 
budget making scheme with a time horizon target of 3 year, during which the estimated amounts for 
those years are to be spread annually in such a manner that they do not exceed the pre-set limits for 
the whole 3 year period. A specific year imbalance is allowed as long as the overall 3 year horizon limit 
is kept. The multi-year budget must be prepared by the Ministry of Finance in coordination with the 
Ministry of Planning and Development and the Central Bank (BCV).  
The LOAF incorporates penalties and sanctions to ministers that deviate from the rules and targets 
established in their multi-year budgets, as well as sanctions and destitution of other public officials.  
As from 2003, pre-assigned fiscal incomes were derogated, which limits the real application of laws 
such as Fides and the Law for Special Economic Assignments (LAEE) and to be started in 2005, but 
did not start until 2006. The stipulated original starting period for the Multi-year budget making 
scheme was 2005, but it was delayed until January 2006. 
 
New Laws Old Practices 
 
The way the budget is elaborated and implemented has not changed much in recent years despite the 
approval of new laws. The main objective of the 2000 Organic Law of Financial Administration of the 
Public Sector (LOAF by its acronym in Spanish) is to regulate the following aspects: the financial 
administration, the internal control mechanisms of expenditures for the public sector, the 
macroeconomic coordination between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry, the 
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (FIEM by its acronym in Spanish), and the Intergenerational 
Saving Fund. Together with the implementation of multi-years budgets in order to keep an inter-
temporal balance, this law also formalized the annual signing of a macroeconomic policy agreement 
between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry. 
 
However, this law has been never fully adopted and the budgetary process has not changed 
significantly since its approval. For example, although in 2003 the first macroeconomic policy 
agreement was signed, it was dismissed almost immediately on grounds of an adverse economic 
situation. Moreover, the multi-year budget supposed to be put in place by 2005 was postponed until 
January 2006. This is a clear example of a modern and formal budgetary rule that is not binding of the 
budget process.  
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Another example is the FIEM, which was established in 1998 in an effort to stabilize the volatile oil 
revenue. Nevertheless, this law has been modified already four times to accommodate the fiscal needs 
of the government, losing its credibility and stabilization power. Also, recently a new Central Bank 
Law was passed. Basically, this law permits the Central Bank to transfer “excess reserves” to the 
government that could be spent in infrastructure projects and debt repayment. This revives the 
practice of deficit financing by the Central Bank which was very common during the seventies and 
eighties.  
 
In summary, despite new laws such as the LOAF and the FIEM informal budget rules are still in 
place. In addition, the new Central Bank Law is just a comeback to practices that past experiences and 
economic literature have both proven that their application fuels inflation and causes macroeconomic 
instability.      
 
 
Evaluation and control stage 
The evaluation and control of the national budget is the responsibility of OCEPRE. This office has 
assigned the role to follow up the execution of the budget regulations and, if necessary, conduct 
investigations regarding any violations to the legal framework by public officers, as well as suggest 
sanctions to the appropriate institutions. All ministries have their own comptroller offices that review 
internal accounts, and all the public sector institutions must follow internal control procedures 
established in the law. It is the Internal Audit Agency (Superintendencia de Auditoría Interna) which has 
auditing power over all public sector institutions, with the exception of the Venezuelan Central Bank. 
The external control responsibility relies on the State's Office of the Comptroller General, which 
carries out the oversight of any operations related with public sector revenues, expenditures, as well as 
public and national goods. It enjoys organizational, administrative, and functional autonomy, and is in 
charge of the inspection of agencies and entities under its control. Nonetheless, despite an extensive 
regulatory and control framework, the fact that in practice little is applied and enforced provides a 
clear indication of lax or inexistent control system of the budgetary process. 
 
 
VI.  Budget amendments in the approval and implementation stage: an 
empirical assessment  
 
This section quantifies the Executive’s proposed budget and the final budget allocated and executed 
by the government during the period 1973-2004. Particular attention is paid to changes in specific 
years, programmes and areas of the budget. This serves to present additional empirical evidence about 
the pattern of interaction between the main actors in the budget-making process
24. In particular, the 
aggregate differences between Executive budget proposals and the final legislation approved and 
executed illustrate four important points: First, Congress, even without altering the overall spending 
levels, has altered the composition of spending proposed by the Executive in the approval stage of the 
budget. Two, consistent with the analysis made in this work, the empirical evidence presented serves 
to identify two different patterns of congressional activity in the period 1973-2004: two periods (1973-
1985 and 1999-2004) characterised by a relatively low level of congressional involvement in the budget 
process and a third period by a high level of involvement (1986-1998). Third, the high number and 
                                                 
24 This section’s analysis derives from primary data aggregated for the study; however, it is also drawn from interviews 
during the fieldwork in Caracas with several former members of the Executive and Legislative branches (Puente, 2005).   34
level of supplementary budgets have contributed to the erosion of the budgetary discipline, 
congressional fiscal controls and have increased spending. Four, it shows evidence about the power of 
specific interest groups in the Executive-Congress budget-making process.  
 
This section is structured as follows: the first section quantifies the changes in the budget level and 
composition in the approval stage by public office and year. It also presents evidence on the three 
sub-periods identified in the budget-making process through 1973 and 2004 and gives some political 
and economic explanations for the high and low levels of congressional activity during this period. 
The last section explains and quantifies the budget amendments in the implementation stage, with 
special emphasis on the supplementary budgets.  
 
The Executive budget approval in Congress 
This phase, consisting of the passage through Congress of the Executive budget law up to its final 
approval, has three crucial aspects. Firstly, whether the scope of the amendments can, for example, 
increase spending and/or reduce revenues. Secondly, a more general aspect is the strategic relation 
between the Executive and the Congress at this stage. Thirdly, how important is the influence of 
different interest groups on the budget approval process. 
In particular, this subdivision of the document is interested in measuring and explaining the 
percentage of deviation between aggregate spending proposed by the Executive and that approved by 
Congress. The absolute value of the difference between the President’s budget request and the 
congressional appropriations (calculated as a percentage of the Executive request) is one measure of 
the distribution of congressional activity. The average annual absolute difference between the 
President’s request and Congress’s allocations supplies a useful summary index of congressional 
activity for the period under consideration. If the Congress has made no changes in a particular 
budget category or public office in the twenty-six-year period, the index of activity will be equal to 0. 
Large or frequent congressional changes in the Executive’s requests (increase or decrease) will yield 
larger values for the index (Kanter, 1972: 133). In particular, three measures of congressional activity 
are employed: Firstly, the increase or reductions in the overall Executive’s budget; secondly, the 
presence or absence of changes in the President’s budget by office; thirdly, the average frequency of 
congressional changes in the different budget items by year. As will be shown, the three measures 
indicate that congressional activity has been concentrated in particular budget categories and years.  
As table 6 shows, the aggregate spending level of the budget law was on average –1.3% percent of the 
initial executive proposal for the period 1973 to 1985 and 5.8% for the period 1986 to 1998. The 
average percentage of variation of the aggregate spending level across the whole period was 2.3%. 
From 1973 to 1985 almost all the changes that the Congress made in the budget were reductions, 
whereas in the rest of the period the majority of changes were increases in the total budget request. 
Since 1985, the tendency to increase the initial proposal has been higher. For example, in 1986 and 
1987, in the Jaime Lusinchi government, the final budget entailed increases of 13.8% and 22.4%, 
respectively. Whereas, in 1993, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2003 and 2004, the aggregate spending figures for 
proposals and the final budget were identical.  
The fact that the overall spending has been increased or decreased in some cases would appear to 
contradict Article 229 of the Constitution about the prohibition of congressional amendments in the 
total spending. As has been explained above, the Venezuelan legal framework allowed for the 
composition of the expenditure or revenue plans to be changed but not the global total. Thus an 
important question is, where did the appropriations increases come from, given that Congress was 
prohibited from initiating them?   35
At least two factors were at play in the Executive budget increases and decreases, one having to do 
with budget estimates within the Executive, and the other with inter-office bargaining. First, Article 
229 of the Constitution clearly established that the Executive unilaterally determined revenue 
estimates and that only these figures could be used in budgeting. However, legislators could object to 
the revenue income because this was usually overestimated. In consequence, in some years they had 
requested the Executive to update its revenue and spending estimates adjusting its proposed bill 
accordingly, and even sponsoring some amendments designed to serve the legislator’s interest during 
that time. Similarly according to Article 22 of the Organic Budget Law, the Executive budget proposal 
was originally submitted in the second half of June. During the following weeks, as fourth-quarter tax 
receipts and economic projections took shape, the Executive itself inevitably wanted to make changes 
to fine-tune its budget projections. The systematic bias in the economic and fiscal forecast of the 
Venezuelan governments increased the necessity for congressional changes in the Executive budget 
request. Therefore, attributing responsibility to Congress for all alterations in Presidential spending on 
request under these circumstances is clearly unrealistic.  
Consistent with these explanations are the interesting insights into the huge budget decrease of 1977 
and the increases in 1987 and 1995, supplied during the interviews by the former Acción Democrática 
president of the congressional Finance Committee Carmelo Lauría:  
 
“In 1977 revenues decreased.  There was an oil crisis that year, therefore a reduction 
had to be made. There was a crisis in which the economy overheated. We had a 
current account deficit of almost 1,500 million dollars and we took the 1977 measures 
in which we established a series of credit restrictions… in 1987… when the budget 
was approved it was done based on the estimates made prior to November; in 
December 1986 the exchange rate was modified and the dollar changed from Bs. 7.50 
to 14.50. This caused a re-estimation of the revenue, hence resulting in a 22% increase, 
since revenue was obtained due to this circumstance. This situation also occurred in 
1995; that year’s devaluation was in December”. 
 
After the submission of the proposal to the Congress, legislators began lobbying for increases as well 
as enlisting Executive officials to sponsor the necessary amendments, because no legislator could 
initiate such changes without Executive sponsorship. The ministers and other Executive officials who 
testified before the Finance Committee were also very influential
25. Congress could increase or 
decrease the total spending only with the Executive approval. This was one of the phases of the 
process where political negotiations between Finance Committee, parties and Executive occurred. 
Legislators made suggestions and proposals and the Executive proposed them as its own, because 
Congress could not make changes in the level of total spending. This congressional influence is an 
additional factor explaining how the final budget bills could appropriate more money than proposals, 





                                                 
25 Direct observation of the Finance Committee members question time (interpelaciones) with executive officials during 
review of the budget proposal in Caracas in 2002 (Puente, 2005)   36
 
 













































Source: Calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004. 
 
Years Proposed budget Budget law  % of change
1973  14,287.7 13,819.4 -3.3%
1974  14,569.2 14,548.7 -0.1%
1975  41,526.4 41,395.7 -0.3%
1976  33,167.1 33,041.5 -0.4%
1977  46,682.8 35,634.3 -23.7%
1978  40,879.7 44,272.8 8.3%
1979  46,540.8 46,340.6 -0.4%
1980  57,076.8 56,685.4 -0.7%
1981  69,994.0 75,743.7 8.2%
1982  87,434.0 86,943.0 -0.6%
1983  77,811.3 76,381.9 -1.8%
1984  77,477.0 77,040.9 -0.6%
1985  103,405.9 102,843.6 -0.5%
1986  107,479.0 122,283.2 13.8%
1987  129,075.5 158,018.9 22.4%
1988  184,101.6 185,122.4 0.6%
1989  183,845.5 183,305.5 -0.3%
1990  419,387.6 443,718.1 5.8%
1991  756,198.9 713,429.6 -5.7%
1992  798,219.1 863,224.0 8.1%
1993  1,105,791.7 1,105,791.7 0.0%
1994  1,330,913.6 1,430,635.2 7.5%
1995  2,369,798.3 2,786,469.0 17.6%
1996  4,104,890.4 4,104,890.4 0.0%
1997  7,825,655.6 7,824,855.6 0.0%
1998  11,243,899.0 11,899,290.0 5.8%
1999           13,943,265,5       13,696,059.0  -1.8%
2000           18,366,037.2       17,878,137.2  -2.7%
2001           22,940,637.0        23,214,303.0  1.2%
2002           26,443,129.3       26,443,129.3  0%
2003           41,600,426.6       41,600,426.6  0%
2004           49,950,883.6       49,950,883.6  0%  37
Changes in budget composition by Congress 
 
Given the unequal prerogatives between the branches of government and data measuring the 
legislative balance of power between the Executive and the Congress, there is a strong temptation to 
simply conclude that the Congress was insignificant in the legislative process, as much literature on 
Latin American legislatures has suggested
26. In particular, the conventional wisdom that holds that the 
Venezuelan Congress has been unwilling to address the budget in policy terms could be a 
consequence of analyses based on highly aggregated data. An exploration within the change in the 
budget law by individual office or aggregate changes in a year suggests that the legislature has had 
more impact in some areas than in others and, more importantly, that congressional budget activity 
has been concerned with more than increasing or reducing the total level of expenditure.  
A measure that is able to distinguish budget categories by year or public office in which there were 
small or infrequent changes in the President’s budget, and those in which there were large or frequent 
changes can obtain a more complete picture. This suggests that the legislature is more influential than 
a concrete reading of the Constitution, the Organic Law of Budget or the internal laws of Congress 
would suggest. Therefore, Congress has had a more substantial impact on the budget process than 
many readers might think, due to both the relatively non-conflictive treatment of the budget in 
Congress, and the legal and constitutional rules portraying Venezuelan governments as extremely 
Executive-dominated. This section provides additional evidence, of a noteworthy level, of 
congressional influence on the budget process during the period 1973-2004. 
Table 7 shows the change in budget law by public agency and office as a percentage of the initial 
Executive proposal submitted to the Congress every year. Some public offices had systematically 
increased their allocation in the budgetary process in Congress. For example, the National Electoral 
Council was the component with the highest average variation. This budget increased from 1977 to 
1998 by an average of 39.9%. However, it is important to mention that this increase was associated 
fundamentally with periods immediately prior to electoral years. As Carmelo Lauría, Acción 
Democrática former Deputy, pointed out in the interviews in Caracas: “…the Executive knew that it 
could send National Electoral Council’s expenses underestimated because the Congress would make 
the corresponding adjustments…” 
In the same line of argument Gustavo Tarre Briceño, a Copei former President of the congressional 
Finance Committee, comments:  
 
“The previous law also provided public financing for political parties and the 
government did not usually include it. That was one reason, the other reason is that 
there was also an electoral process and the Executive did not make the necessary 
provision for this, just as is happening now with the referendum. There is no funding 
in the 2004 budget, hence, there has to be supplementary budgets to pay for the 
referendum.” 
The Presidency Office (17.61%) increased its proposals in almost every year. The resources allocated 
to this ministry had the particularity that they were available and were used to a high degree at the 
Executive’s discretion. Additional insights into the increase of this Ministry are given by Carmelo 
Lauría: 
 
                                                 
26 For a complete analysis of the balance of powers between Executive and Legislative in Latin American countries see 
Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997 and Payne et al., 2002.   38
 “…If you make a breakdown of this I assure you that you will find that this 17% is 
composed of changes in allocations for CVG, CONAC, and CORDIPLAN. The 
Presidential offices were attached to the Presidency Office which is another of the 
things corresponding to the President’s office according to the law. Besides this you 
had the development corporations. So, if you analyse this 17% it is the Presidency 
Office, but the decentralised entities attached to the Ministry. This was the reason why 
this office was created, to decentralise these entities from the Presidency of the 
Republic and attach them to a Ministry…” 
 
As has already been explained in the analysis of interest groups, in the 1970s and the first part of the 
1980s the Venezuelan state grew rapidly to comprise approximately four hundred entities in the 
decentralised public administration. These took many legal forms, including state-owned enterprises, 
autonomous institutes, foundations, credit and finances agencies and regional development 
corporation (e.g. CVG). They undertook activities in areas as diverse as agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and electricity, construction, finance, real state, etc. The independent legal status of 
these offices of the Decentralised Public Administration gave them substantial degrees of autonomy 
with respect to income and expenditure (Crips, Levine & Rey, 1995: 154). For example, in 1974, 
during the Carlos Andrés Pérez government the planned net transfer of budgetary resources to the 
private sector through public offices was enormous. When combined with CORPOINDUSTRIA for 
a small and medium sized industry, the Urban Development Fund, for the construction industry, and 
the CVF, the Venezuelan Industrial Bank and the regional development corporations it reached 
unprecedented levels (Karl, 1997, 134). Then, during the 1970s and 1980s, an important amount of 
financial resources was requested in the budget process for these public entities. 
Likewise, an important proportion of the external debt was owed or guaranteed by the public sector, 
including those offices of the Decentralised Public Administration, which lacked adequate control and 
oversight mechanisms. The lack of control mechanisms by either the Executive or the Congress 
meant that many state agencies were left free to incur external debt on their own initiative. When 
attempts were made to institute needed controls, decentralised offices began to borrow from public 
financial institutions which, in turn, increased their own overseas’ borrowing (McCoy & Smith, 1995: 
271). Thus, as a consequence of huge amounts of borrowing, the budget allocations to the 
Decentralised Public Administration in the 1970s and part of the 1980s were even larger. 
Not surprisingly Congress itself also increased its budget by more than 16.9% during the study 
period.
27 As has been pointed out, Gustavo Tarre Briceño in one of the interviews in Caracas in 2003 
said: “…everyone asked for much more than they needed in order to later accept cut-downs and the 
Congress was assigned much less because everyone knew that afterwards it would insure it would 
increase its budget again…” 
 
Other offices that systematically increased their share of the total budget in the congressional budget 
approval were the Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Ministry of the Environment, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Defence. Almost every sector increased their share in the 
budget with the exception of the Ministry of Energy and Mines (-0.97), the Ministry of Youth (-
1.06%) and the Ministry of Information and Tourism (-5.19%). According to the evidence, it seems 
                                                 
27 Certain outlays have been to a significant degree outside the purview of the Budget Office and the Ministry of Finance. 
Outlays for Congress and the National Court of Justice have been among them, and rightly so, because they have been 
equal branches of the government. How could they be independent, it has been asserted, if the Executive controlled their 
money?   39
reasonable to suggest that the budget decisions relating to the three previously mentioned sectors had 
commanded relatively little congressional attention.  
 
During the interviews, Gustavo Tarre Briceño makes an interesting point concerning the allocations to 
the Ministry of the Environment:  
 
“One of these aspects during the period I participated in [Congress] was a centralist 
Executive, a decentralising Congress in expenditure matters. Hence, this aspect had 
great influence in taking away central power and giving it to the States… that explains 
why, for example, in the Ministry of Environment you have the water companies and 
can see that the increase in the Ministry is because Hidroven is there as well as the 
different regional companies, thus explaining why this ministry appears as one of the 
highest [on the list of supplementary budgets]…” 
 
This distribution of Congress’s changes in the Executive budget is consistent with the hypothesis that 
Congress had a programmatic as well as a fiscal orientation towards particular areas of the budget; 
namely, its judgments regarding specific programmes and their relation to legislature and party 
interests, rather than an exclusive concern with reducing spending, eliminating waste or preserving 
budget discipline
28. For the Congress, and in particular for the members of the Finance Committee, 
budgeting was their purpose and one of their powers. For members of the Congress with strong issue 
preferences, budgetary action could provide power because this stage of the budget process became 
the target of opportunity for ‘rent seekers’. And in particular for leaders of the political parties and 
influential Deputies, the totals for big programmes in the budget resolutions measure their party’s 
influence on the course of government. 
Moreover, with the exception of 1983, 1996 and 1998 (the years of the Copei and the Convergencia 
governments), the Executive branch achieved the passage of the budget in the constitutionally 
mandated period. In doing so, it had to take into account the wishes of Congress in the approval stage 
of the budget to a much greater extent than had been the cases in those years in which the Executive 
branch had employed the previous year’s budget (presupuesto reconducido). This factor generated a further 
incentive to make agreements that benefited the constituencies or groups of interests close to 
legislators. Like spending ministers, members of Congress could propose amendments that benefited 
their constituencies or groups of interests, failing to internalise the budget costs associated with these 
measures.  
Thus, the cross-sectional variations in congressional activity support the view that congressional 
average increases in the President’s budget were concentrated in a group of public offices and 
ministries: the Ministry of Industry, the Presidency Office, the Ministry of the Environment, the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, the Supreme Council of Justice, and in a high proportion 
in the Congress’s own budget rather than by equally distributed resources between all public offices 
(table 7). One may conclude from these results that congressional activity and, inferentially, 
congressional interest was concentrated on those sectors. Certain budget categories appeared to attract 
more congressional interest than others. Thus, the Legislative, even without altering the overall 
spending levels, pressed for redistribution of appropriations across programmes, areas and public 
offices.  
 
                                                 
28 However, it is important to recognise the possibility that legislature affected constituent welfare in many ways besides 
the direct allocation of public spending, for example by promoting regulatory, trade and tax policies that were favourable 
to legislators or party interest.   40
Table 7. Congressional changes in President’s budget requests by public office, 
1973-2004 
 
Public offices 1973-1998 1999-2004 1973-2004
National Electoral Council (1977-2004) 39.91% -8.21% 29.60%
Ministry of Industry (1977-2004) 21.83% -11.67% 14.65%
Presidency Office (min sec presidencia) (1978-2004) 17.61% 8.73% 15.64%
Congress(1977-2004) 16.91% 3.96% 14.14%
Ministry of Environment (1978-2004) 14.90% -5.16% 10.44%
Ministry of Transport & Communications (1978-2004) 13.34% 16.88% 14.13%
Supreme Council of Justice 9.31% 0.73% 7.70%
Ministry of Urban Development (1978-1999) 8.37% -8.61% 7.60%
Ministry of Agriculture (1973-1999, 2003-2004) 7.79% -9.38% 6.01%
Public Prosecutor’s Office 7.46% 1.11% 6.27%
National Comptroller 6.86% -4.07% 4.81%
Ministry of Family (1973-1999) 6.86% 16.31% 7.21%
Ministry of Justice (1973-1999) 6.69% 2.57% 6.54%
Ministry of Defence 6.13% 0.72% 5.12%
Judiciary Council (1977-2000) 6.05% -5.02% 5.13%
Attorney’s Office  5.07% -0.27% 4.07%
Ministry of Internal Affairs 3.91% -1.34% 2.93%
Ministry of Education 3.67% 0.53% 3.08%
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 3.40% -1.76% 2.43%
Ministry of Finance 2.05% -3.43% 1.02%
Ministry of Health 1.61% -1.49% 1.03%
Ministry of Labour -0.46% -0.25% -0.42%
Ministry of Energy & Mines -0.97% -11.76% -2.99%
Ministry of Youth (1978-1987) -1.06% 0.00% -1.06%
Ministry of Information and Tourism(1978-1985) -5.19% 0.00% -5.19%
Ministry of planning and development (2000-2004) 0.00% 25.82% 25.82%
Ministry of science and tecnology (2000-2004) 0.00% 9.41% 9.41%
Peoples defender (2001-2004) 0.00% 4.26% 4.26%
Vice-presidency Office. (2001-2004) 0.00% -0.07% -0.07%
Ministry of universitary education (2003-2004) 0.00% -0.05% -0.05%
Ministry of comunication and information (2003-2004) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Moral Power (2004) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
National Audit Office (2004) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Recficaciones (1999-2004) 0.00% -2.12% -2.12%
TOTAL (1999-2004) 0.00% -0.54% -0.54% 
Source: Own calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004. 
 
 
Patterns of congressional activity: some explanations  
 
The interaction between the Executive and the Congress is very important in terms of budget 
allocations because both political authorities have to approve the budgetary decisions. The question 
arises as to what happens when both authorities have arrived at different decisions. According to the 
data, especially during the period 1986-1998, there was no clear consensus between the Executive and 
the Legislative on how to address the problem. As can be seen in figure 6, congressional activity was 
relatively high during the period 1986 and 1998 while the periods 1973 and 1985 and 1999 and 2004   41
were characterised by somewhat fewer or smaller changes by Congress, which is evidence of the fact 
that Congress accepted and ratified the budget decisions of the Executive.  
Interesting also is the aspect that, in those periods, the budget approved by Congress was lower in 
some years compared with the Executive request. From the fiscal years of 1973 and 1985 all the 
Congress allocation varied from the Presidential request by less than 5%. From 1986 to 1998, three 
annual appropriations involved changes of less than 5% percent, six more than 26% and one (1986) 
more than 36%. When compared to average changes per year since 1986 until 1998 in the budget, 
congressional alterations or redistributions in the President’s budget request were large. Consequently, 
and consistent with the analysis made above, it is possible to identify three different patterns of 
congressional activity in the period 1973-2004 (figure 2): two are characterised by a relatively low level 
of congressional involvement in the budget process (1973-1985 and 1999-2004), and the other by a 
high level of involvement (1986-1998)  
 
Figure 2. Average Congressional changes by Office in President’s budget requests by year, 












































































































































Source: Calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004. The average was calculated using the absolute value. 
 
Consequently, the above aggregate figures, especially from 1986 to 1998, somewhat understate the 
extent to which Executive proposals were amended. In contrast to the vision of an insulated 
Executive power, the data on congressional activity shows that, on average, more than 20% of the 
legislative initiatives of the Executive were modified by Congress (amendments to the presidential 
budget). Even without altering the overall spending levels, legislators pressed for redistribution of 
appropriations across programmes, areas or public offices. In various ways the budget was formulated 
to contain ‘something for everyone’ to ensure passage through Congress and benefit sectors of 
interest for the legislator (Drazen, 2000: 706).    42
At least two forms of bargaining were used by the Venezuelan Congress to build majority coalitions to 
make decisions about budget allocations and, in consequence, to bring about redistribution of 
resources across programmes, public offices and areas: logrolling and compromise. Logrolling was an 
exchange of voting support on different budgets by different members of Congress. It was an 
effective means of coalition building because members were rarely equally concerned about all the 
public spending distributional decisions. Second, compromise, unlike logrolling, built coalitions 
through negotiation over the content of legislation. Each party agreed to modify policy goals on a 
given bill in a way that was generally acceptable to the other. A middle ground was often found. For 
example, if Acción Democrática supported a public programme in education for 50 million and Copei 
wanted to increase the allocation to 100 million; the parties would be expected to meet and 
compromise on a 75 million allocation, a middle point between both requests. 
Likewise, an intermediate position usual in the Venezuelan political system was ‘negotiate support’. 
The ruling parties, Acción Democrática and Copei, supported the Executive in return for some 
concessions, such as granting legislators “a seat at the policy table”, which translates into allowing 
legislators to scrutinize and modify bills (Corrales, 2002: 12).  
Explanations for the dramatic change in congressional activity observed may be divided into two 
general classes: firstly, considerations of domestic politics reflected in Presidential and congressional 
budget-making processes; secondly, the variations in budgetary activism may also reflect Congress’s 
changing assessment of the Executive’s handling of economic policy. 
As has been shown, the dramatic increase in the congressional activity occurred in the period of Jaime 
Lusinchi and then continued through successive periods of Carlos Andrés Pérez, the transitional 
government of Ramón J. Velazquez, and the presidency of Rafael Caldera. There was a high level of 
congressional activity in this period (1986-1998), which in many cases took the form of important 
increases in the Executive budget. These budget changes in this period may be seen as a response to 
the changing perceptions of domestic political conditions. In particular, two political factors are 
important in explaining the change in pattern: firstly, the increase in party fragmentation; and 
secondly, the visible decay of tight party discipline. 
In the 1980s and 1990s the major parties Acción Democrática and Copei and the organizations that 
represented specific interest, such as FEDECAMARAS in the business sector and CTV for unions, 
started to lose their capacity to aggregate, channel and manage the demands and interests of the 
sectors they supposedly represented. Moreover, trust in these institutions deteriorated, and within each 
of them internal discipline declined, leading members to question the leadership and reducing the 
margins for action and representativeness. This increased the number and differences among the 
actors involved, fractionalised the sectoral leadership, and generated more complex, costly and less 
predictable patterns of negotiation (Kornblith, 1995: 93). The power started to be fragmented, 
resulting in a systematic incapacity to form viable governing alliances. Party discipline and party-
government coherency decayed, with serious implications for the ability of either the Executive or 
Congress to act effectively and with reasonable dispatch in public policy and particularly in budgetary 
policy. 
In particular, party fragmentation rose very significantly at the end of the 1980s. The Venezuelan 
political system became more atomised with more parties represented in Congress; this fragmentation 
was an important factor in explaining the increase in congressional activity in Venezuela. Conventional 
wisdom argues that the lower the number of parties (e.g. the larger the government’s majority party in 
Congress), the lower the transaction cost of redistributing and allocating budgetary resources for the 
president. The hypothesis comes from an extensive literature claiming that party fragmentation in the 
legislature tends to be inversely associated with the size of the president’s party (Jones, 1995, 
Mainwaring & Scully 1995, Mainwaring & Shugart 1997, Linz & Valenzuela 1994). Thus, a president   43
with a smaller party contingent or facing many legislative parties would have to compromise and 
distribute patronage and “pork barrel” among the opposition in order to gather a legislative majority 
willing to pass his budget proposal.  
A good example of this was the period of President Rafael Caldera during 1994 and 1999. In 1993 
while Acción Democrática and Copei were harshly punished at the polls, they still controlled a 
majority of seats in Congress. The arithmetic of votes in Congress made it clear that Rafael Caldera 
could not create a legislative majority without either Acción Democrática or Copei. When President 
Caldera took office in February 1994, his party in the Chamber of Deputies, Convergencia 
commanded only 13% of the seats. His Legislative situation was quite difficult in terms of party 
support and was further complicated. Had he wanted to form a stable legislative majority, he would 
have had to make an enormous number of concessions to the largest parties in Congress. Thus, 
incentives for distribution of patronage and “pork” among opposition legislators were very clear in 
that period.  
Equally, party discipline has been proposed as an important factor contributing to a president’s 
legislative success: in this case, the proportion of a president’s budget that wins approval in Congress 
without amendments. The Venezuelan democracy before the dramatic erosion of its parties at the end 
of the 1980s was a system with strong party discipline. Whereas, the period of low level of 
congressional activity between the 1970s and most of the 1980s was still characterised by oppositions 
and critiques and counter proposals. However the winning factors of an Acción Democrática and 
Copei majority and relatively strong party discipline ensured that the deals made between the 
Executive branch and the Congress were, for the most part, respected and the number of 
amendments of the budget very low. It would therefore be a mistake to infer from the relatively 
smooth passage of the President’s budget in Congress that the budget was totally Executive-
dominated during that period. Rather, the absence of conflict is explained in particular by two factors: 
first, a relatively disciplined Acción Democrática and Copei legislative majority that allowed for 
bargaining over the budget to be conducted in an intra-parties and less public manner; and second, the 
fact that most serious negotiation over the budget between legislators and the Executive branch 
normally took place prior to the formal submission of the budget to the Congress. Former Deputy 
Carmelo Lauría, who had witnessed most of the congressional budget procedures, describes the 
process in the 1970s and part of the 1980s vividly as follows: 
 
“…whatever was decided was usually carried out; when discussion was passed on to 
the plenary, they had already talked with his Deputy and, if there were any differences, 
then it was redefined by the corresponding Committee or these were presented in the 
parties’ instances. However, once the decision had been made, the Deputies followed 
the party line…” 
 
Finally, the variations in budgetary activism may also reflect Congress’s changing assessment of the 
Executive’s handling of economic policy. It is as if when Congress’s confidence in the Executive is 
high, it makes fewer and minor changes in its budget. Larger and more frequent amendments to the 
Executive’s budget request may signal the dissatisfaction of Congress with its performance and its 
determination to take a more active role in budget policy and in the economic policy in general 
(Kanter, 1972: 138). In some cases, triggered by disagreements over implementation of economic 
change, ruling party leaders turn against the Executive or, at least, against the economic authorities. 
The ruling party becomes a quasi-opposition force interested in blocking the Executive’s agenda. A 
good example of this case was Venezuela between 1989 and 1992 during the implementation of the 
economic adjustment programme. The leadership of the governing party Acción Democrática was   44
strongly in opposition to the reforms (e.g. the tax reform)
29. President Carlos Andrés Pérez tried to 
adopt controversial economic reforms by neglecting his own party and giving key economic posts to 
non-Acción Democrática members. Having few options to pursue a political career outside the party, 
Acción Democrática legislators staged a revolt against the Pérez government, which resulted in 
ministerial impeachments and concluded with the impeachment and ousting of Pérez himself in 1993. 
In economic policy, and in particular budgetary policy, the Pérez administration was an Acción 
Democrática government without “AD” support in Congress. Equally, his successor, as mentioned 
above, Rafael Caldera, failed to form a reliable and stable alliance of parties in Congress among other 
factors, because the dissatisfaction with the economic policies that the Government had 
implemented
30. Thus, the policy of form consensus for budgetary policy in those periods was much 
more difficult. 
In conclusion, the potential for governability in Venezuela was poor at the end of the 1980s. 
Compared to its highly governable past, society was more polarised and Congress was fragmented and 
divided. This period was generally characterised by the decline and eventual breakdown of 
cooperation and a volatile budget-making process. It was a period characterised by a higher number of 
fragmented and polarised actors in the policy-making process and, in general, higher transaction costs 
(Monaldi et al., 2004). Venezuela suffered the initiation of a period characterised by weaker Presidents, 
a decline in party discipline
31, increasing levels of party fragmentation, and electoral abstention. 
Consequently, it was a period characterised by weaker Presidents in the budget-making process and as 
result was characterised by confrontation between the Executive and the Congress over economic 
policy and in particular over budget policy. 
In contrast, the first period from 1973 to 1988
32 was generally characterised by an institutionalised 
cooperative budget-making process with a low number of key players. This allowed the Presidents to 
conduct budget policy consultation with a very limited number of actors. It was, in general, a period of 
a highly centralised, disciplined and non-fragmented party system (closed list, no regional elections, 
etc), a low level of abstention, a marginalized legislature and controlled delegation to a predominant 
President with control over regional governors. The result is Executive branches with important 
powers in the budget-making process. 
 
Budget amendments in the implementation stage  
The formulation of the budget in the Executive and its approval in the Legislature together comprise 
only one part of the budget process. If one defines budgeting in the broader sense as the allocation of 
the resources available to the government, it is evident that several other decision-making processes 
                                                 
29 Other interesting cases in Latin America of opposition to reforms by the party in government were Haiti, Paraguay, and 
Ecuador in the mid 1990s (Corrales, 2002: 12). 
30 As mentioned before, in 1996 and 1998 Caldera’s government employed the previous year’s budget (presupuesto 
reconducido) because his budgets were not approved by Congress. 
31 Consistent with this analysis, Weldon (2002) argues that unified government, high discipline and strong presidential 
leadership over the party are necessary conditions to preserve the power of the President in budgetary issues. The 
resolution of the budget process, therefore, is influenced by these “metaconstitutional” mechanisms (institutional 
arrangements that are defined outside the Constitution and the laws), though they are highly dependent on legal 
institutions (such as the relation between no re-election and high discipline). When the three conditions hold it is possible 
to expect the President to have his budget passed without interference from Congress. If any of these conditions are 
lacking, then greater intervention by Congress is possible: greater incidence of not approving the budget, greater incidence 
of amendments to the budget, longer time allowed to examine and approve the budget, and so on. 
32 However, as was shown above, in strict budget terms it has been possible to verify a different pattern of Congressional 
activity since 1986.   45
must also be taken into account. These include supplementary budgets, rescissions of unspent funding 
(insubsistencias), transference of resources between budget chapters, and other budget amendments 
during the implementation stage of the budget
33. In particular, supplementary budgets represent an 
additional point of budgetary interaction among the budget-making actors and patterns in the use of 
those appropriations may be related to regular appropriations
34. In consequence, they may illuminate 
the budgetary bargaining between the Executive and the Congress and the influence of different 
interest groups. This section presents additional empirical evidence about this implementation phase 
of the budget
35. 
In the Venezuelan case during the implementation stage the budget could be modified after approval 
by the Congress only but by initiative of the Executive. In consequence, supplementary budgets have 
been in the first instance of an Executive initiative; however, during the initiation, approval and 
execution of these, in one way or another, the two main actors (Executive and Congress) in the 
budget-making process have been involved. 
However, the main question that arises in this sub-section is what was the percentage deviation 
between aggregate spending in the annual Venezuelan budget-making process and the total amount 
actually spent at the end of the budgetary year? 
Table 8 provides data describing the difference between budget law and the “agreed+modifications 
budget” (including supplementary budgets and other budget amendments) between 1973-2004. The 
first observation to be made is that, with a few exceptions, the Budget Office has underestimated the 
final budget. The second is that the errors, particularly in years of oil booms, have been very high. The 
flows of amendments, especially supplementary budgets, appear to follow the level of oil prices, 
increasing during oil booms and dropping thereafter. It has proven more difficult to reduce 
supplementary budgets in years where revenue has been strong as a consequence of a typical boom in 
oil prices (e.g. 1974, 1980, 1984, 1989, 1996 and 2004). In many cases the Venezuelan experience has 
shown that high oil prices are the perfect excuse to increase public expenditure through 
supplementary budgets. 
As a consequence of the oil boom and a testament to lack of planning, these supplementary budgets 
reached an astonishing 192% in 1974 and averaged 30% of the initial budgets during the next four 
years. Once President Carlos Andrés Pérez had permitted the 1974 budget to triple there was no 
                                                 
33 During the implementation stage of the budget, new opportunities arise for the legislators and the Executive to deviate 
from the budget law and serve demands for additional spending. Two conflicting forces become important: the degree to 
which the budget law binds government’s actions during the fiscal year, and the degree of flexibility to respond to 
unforeseen events. The binding force of the law depends on the ability to enact amendments during the fiscal year, and on 
the power of the finance minister to enforce the original budget. The degree of flexibility is related to the possibility of 
introducing supplementary budgets during the fiscal year, the ability to transfer resources between budget chapters, the 
existence of a budget reserve and the possibility of setting aside unused funds for future expenditures (carryover). 
According to these criteria, Venezuela’s budget law was weakly binding and the budget implementation was inordinately 
flexible. There were no cash limits on spending ministries, the finance ministers and OCEPRE lacked power to block 
expenditures, budget changes and transfers of expenditures between chapters were routinely adopted, and carryover 
procedures were extremely flexible (Milesi-Ferreti, 1996; Von Hagen & Harden, 1995). 
34 As will be explained below, it is clear in the Venezuelan case that supplemental spending has allowed governments to 
circumvent budgetary enforcement mechanisms and to deliberately under-fund programmes in the regular budget 
allocation process. 
35 In particular, the amendments submitted and approved by the Executive in the implementation stage of the budget have 
been the following: rectifications (rectificaciones), elimination of credits (insubsistencias) and transfer to budget credits between 
items of no more than 5% of the total credits. Similarly, the amendments submitted by the Executive but approved by the 
Congress have been the following: transfer to budget credits between items of more than 5% of the total credits and 
supplementary budgets (AVPP, 1995: 283)   46
turning back. In the 1970s, the spending expanded throughout the bureaucracy, initial government 
goals and plans were deemed too modest, and public offices were actually asked to revise their 
budgets upward so that the government could spend more money more quickly. As a consequence, 
public offices increasingly relied on supplementary budgets, which had the additional advantage of 
being partially removed from congressional scrutiny. 
This pattern did not change when presidential power shifted from Acción Democrática to Copei, 
despite President Herrera’s pledge not to repeat the mistakes of the past in his period between 1978 
and 1983. During the second oil boom, between 1979 and 1981, the actual spending was on average 
more than 25% of the original budget approved at the beginning of the year. In 1989, during the 
second Carlos Andrés Pérez government, supplementary budgets represented a whopping 74% of the 
initial budget and more than 9% of the GDP (table 8). This implies that the final budget had almost 
doubled as a consequence of multiple supplementary budgets. From this data it is evident that 
Congress routinely approved the Executive request for supplementary budgets. It can be inferred 
from this simple relationship that Congress found it politically difficult or inconvenient not to approve 
an Executive request whether or not it was made on an emergency basis. 
 
Table 8. Difference between budget law and “agreed+modifications budget” as percentage of 
change, 1973-2004 
 




1973  13.819,4 14.833,8 7,3% 
1974  14.548,7 42.482,7 192,0% 
1975  41.395,7 39.747,3 -4,0% 
1976  33.041,5 44.445,4 34,5% 
1977  35.634,3 50.506,7 41,7% 
1978  44.272,8 51.005,8 15,2% 
1979  46.340,6 50.757,9 9,5% 
1980  56.685,4 72.477,2 27,9% 
1981  75.743,7 94.082,6 24,2% 
1982  86.943,0 86.393,3 -0,6% 
1983  76.381,9 78.863,2 3,2% 
1984  77.040,9 103.138,2 33,9% 
1985  102.843,6 112.772,4 9,7% 
1986  122.283,2 123.631,1 1,1% 
1987  158.018,9 181.121,5 14,6% 
1988  185.122,4 186.753,0 0,9% 
1989  183.305,5 319.477,0 74,3% 
1990  443.718,1 577.056,1 30,1% 
1991  713.429,6 801.257,1 12,3% 
1992  863.224,0 1.002.246,7 16,1% 
1993  1.105.791,7 1.100.718,1 -0,5% 
1994  1.430.635,2 1.939.106,4 35,5% 
1995  2.786.469,0 2.808.188,0 0,8% 
1996  4.104.890,4 6.441.531,7 56,9% 
1997  7.824.855,6 10.667.553,6 36,3% 
1998  11.947.398,9 11.845.176,7 -0,9% 
1999  13.696.059,0 14.557.817,0 6,3% 
2000  17.878.137,2 23.553.560,8 31,7%   47
2001  23.214.303,0 28.079.215,2 21,0% 
2002  26.443.129,3 31.687.452,4 19,8% 
2003  41.600.426,6 41.613.124,5 0,03% 
2004  49.950.883,6 60.505.058,4 21,1% 
Note: “agreed+modifications budget/budget law.  
Source: Own calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004. 
 
In summary, the total spending level as a consequence of supplementary budgets was on average 
29.3% higher than the budget law throughout the period 1973 to 2004 (figure 8). In all the years 
between 1973 and 2004 the budget increased as a consequence of the supplementary budgets that 
Congress approved. The Executive and Congress enacted more than 1900 supplementary budgets 
during the period 1973-2004. In each of the 30 years the Congress approved supplemental resources 
for the current year. Annual supplementary budgets funding ranged from a high of 2.900 million 
bolivars (164 supplementary budgets) in 1997 to a low of 4.4 million bolivars in 1975 (51 
supplementary budgets). The highest levels of increase in the supplementary budgets as a percentage 
of the total budget occurred in 1974 (192%), 1989 (87%) and 1996 (57%), in response to the increase 
in oils price during those periods. The aggregate final spending level as a consequence of 
supplementary budgets was on average 29.3% higher than the budget law throughout the period 1973 
to 2004, with the range varying between 0.8% for 1995 and 192% for 1974 (figure 3 & table 8). 
Therefore, a review of budget patterns in Venezuela indicates that actual spending was largely at 
variance with budget priorities established in the original budget law approved at the beginning of 
every year, contributing substantially to the fragmentation of the budgetary process and the weakening 
of spending control. 
 
In the Venezuelan case, the legislation determined in principle that no actions or programmes that 
involved new spending could be carried out without specifying how they were to be financed; 
however in practice, the budget had loopholes thorough which expenditures were made without much 
planning. Congress often approved the initiation of activities without specifying the resources, stating 
vaguely that budgetary resources would finance them. In practical terms, when the Executive and the 
Congress agreed to undertake supplementary budgets to relieve financial pressure on certain public 
agencies, they usually suffered no political cost because they did not increase the income, reduce or cut 
programmes to finance the new spending. They just increased the deficit and financed this through 
debt or other extra-ordinary sources of fiscal income. Thus, supplementary budgets were designed to 
give governments the flexibility to respond to problems or priorities that may not have been 
anticipated during the regular budget cycle. However, given their high number and level throughout 
Venezuela’s budgetary history they have been a source of fiscal indiscipline, increasing spending, the 




























































































































































Source: Calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004. 
 
 
Supplementary budgets by public office and agency 
 
As the above analysis shows, a review of the actual spending patterns by public office and agency 
indicates that spending was largely at variance with budget priorities established in the original budget 
law approved at the beginning of every year. In particular, powerful ministers and public officers 
incurred in large number of supplementary budgets. The result was that the average deviation in actual 
allocation versus budgeting allocation was over 29% for the period between 1973 and 2004 (figure 3) 
with the range varying between 38.99% for the Ministry of Finance and 0.01% for the Attorney’s 
Office (table 9). 
 
Table 9 shows the proportion of supplementary budgets by public agency and office as a percentage 
of the total submitted to the Congress every year for the period 1973-2004. The Columns show the 
average of all supplementary budgets by periods. As can be seen from the data, some sectors have 
systematically increased their allocation in the budgetary process in Congress. For example, the 
Ministry of Finance was the component with the highest average variation. This ministry increased its 
budget on average more than 38.99% for the period. This level was associated fundamentally with 
supplementary budgets allocated to the ministry for the payments of internal and external debt. As has 
been already been explained, when it was necessary to increase some other item of the budget, one of 
the classical solutions was a reduction in the allocation of the debt (underestimation), redistributing 
from this item to another in which the Deputies had some political interest and then, during the fiscal 
year, the Congress decreed supplementary budgets to correct the deficit.   49
 
Table 9. Supplementary budgets by public office as a percentage of the total,  
1973-2004 
Public offices  %73-98 %99-04  %73-04 
National Electoral Council (1977-2004)  0.85% 1.74%  1.05% 
Ministry of Industry (1977-2004) 1.57% 0.71%  1.45% 
Presidency Office (1978-2004)  1.84% 0.32%  1.51% 
Congress (1977-2004)  0.13% 0.32%  0.17% 
Ministry of Environment (1978-2004)  4.56% 1.42%  3.89% 
Ministry of Transport & Communications (1978-2004) 9.18% 6.55%  7.84% 
Supreme Council of Justice  0.03% 1.50%  0.31% 
Ministry of Urban Development (1978-1999)  4.24% 2.39%  5.12% 
Ministry of Agriculture (1973-1999, 2003-2004)  5.03% 2.88%  4.74% 
Public Prosecutor’s Office.  0.01% 0.19%  0.12% 
National Comptroller  0.03% 0.04%  0.03% 
Ministry of Family (1973-1999)  1.44% 0.51%  0.66% 
Ministry of Justice (1973-1999)  0.33% 0.53%  0.34% 
Ministry of Defence  4.47% 4.43%  4.46% 
Judiciary Council (1977-2000)  0.51% 0.06%  0.45% 
Attorney’s Office (Procuraduría)  0.12% 0.03%  0.01% 
Ministry of Internal Affairs  7.28% 12.02%  8.16% 
Ministry of Education  14.56% 14.13%  14.48% 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  0.46% 0.26%  0.42% 
Ministry of Finance  38.91% 39.36%  38.99% 
Ministry of Health  4.63% 4.67%  4.63% 
Ministry of Labour  0.93% 5.12%  1.71% 
Ministry of Energy & Mines  0.13% 0.71%  0.66% 
Ministry of Youth (1978-1987)  0.67%    0.39% 
Ministry of Information and Tourism (1978-1985)  0.40%    0.40% 
Ministry of planning and development (2000-2004)     1.05%  1.05% 
Ministry of science and technology (2000-2004)     0.43%  0.43% 
Peoples defender (2001-2004)     0.18%  0.03% 
Vice-presidency Office. (2001-2004)     0.01%  0.02% 
Ministry of universitary education (2003-2004)     6.49%  6.49% 
Ministry of communication and information (2003-
2004)     1.51%  1.51% 
Moral Power (2004)     0.02%  0.02% 
National Audit Office (2004)     0.01%  0.01% 
Rectifications (1999-2004)     0.00%  0.00% 
Total (1999-2004)     100.00%  100.00% 
Average for the period   4.09% 3.54%  3.38% 
Source: Calculation based on National Budget data from 1973-2004.   50
As pointed out in the interview with the former Christian Democratic Deputy and former president of 
the Finance Committee Haydée Castillo: “Who can deny a supplementary budget for payments of 
debt if it was compulsory?”. In the same line of argument, the former Acción Democrática Deputy 
and former Ministry and president of the Finance Committee Carmelo Lauría explains: 
 
“…Basically debt [the budget item usually cut].  First, because it was the easiest to 
carry out, remember what you could take from other items whenever there was an 
expenditure underestimation, because you could not deduct it from the payroll, 
remember, this is a 96% inflexible budget…That is why you will find indebtedness in 
the other ministries; those items that you thought were not necessary and that the 
government was including for political reasons, you changed” 
 
In terms of the economic components of the budget, tactical cuts in the budget approval tended to fall 
heavily on non-staff costs, thereby compounding the effect on the operation of government services. 
Another likely candidate was capital spending. Outlays on salaries, however, were rarely touched. 
Then, as was mentioned above, during the implementation stage of the budget Congress decreed 
supplementary resources to correct the deficit. In particular, in the 1970s, supplementary budgets were 
decreed to cover spending evenly between capital and current spending, and in the 1980s and 1990s 
were overwhelmingly associated with current spending
36. An important amount of money went to 
salaries, transfers for the decentralised public administration, and payments of internal and external 
debt. Thus, most of the supplementary budgets in the study period fell into three categories: 
supplementary pay to cover the cost of government salaries, including pensioners, whose amounts 
were either not known or were underestimated at the time when the budget was enacted; current 
transfers to the public agencies and decentralised offices; and payments of debt. 
 
After the Ministry of Finance, the second largest recipient of supplementary budgets was the Ministry 
of Education. This ministry increased its budget in every year with almost 5 supplementary budgets 
per year and 14.5% of supplemental spending during 1973 and 2004. Only in 1997 were more than 
701.744 million bolivars approved in Congress for this sector. The resources allocated to this Ministry 
were used to a significant degree to finance the requests from the national public universities 
 
Not surprisingly, the Ministry of internal affairs and Ministry of Transport and Communication 
(MTC) also increased its budgets and took more than 8.2% and 7.8% respectively of the total 
supplemental funds. Even though the MTC correlation between the number and amount of the 
supplementary budgets was negative (the increase in the total budget of the ministry was 2.7%), MTC 
received a substantial number of supplemental budgets in almost every year of the period, totalling on 
average 6 per year. Other offices that systematically increased their share of the total budget through 
the supplementary budgets were the Ministry of Agriculture (4.7%), the Ministry of Defence (4.5%) 
and the Ministry of the Environment (3.9%). Of all the supplementary budgets enacted between 1973 
and 2004, more than two-thirds fell under the control of the Finance, Education, Internal Affairs and 
Transport Ministries. Likewise, almost one Fifth of the total supplementary resources fell within the 
sectors of environment, agriculture, health and social assistance and defence. Thus, this increase in the 
use of supplementary budgets confirms the fact that those allocations were political decisions that 
reflected the willingness of the Executive and Congress to undertake additional allocations for some 
programmes or sectors of interest (Wleizen, 1993: 70).  
                                                 
36 Current expenditures were the item in the economic classification of the budget that showed the greatest increase in the 
period 1974-1999 (Puente, 2005).   51
Given this record, it is unsurprising that the governments regarded education, health, agriculture and 
defence as being among their biggest budget headaches; however, virtually throughout the period of 
this study their attempts to reduce the number of supplemental allocations to these sectors were 
stymied by well-organised interest groups. For example, overrepresentation of the rural sectors in the 
Legislature and particularly within the Acción Democrática party multiplied the effectiveness of 
political pressures in the agricultural area.
37 The military sector as shown by the data and 
acknowledged by Ramon Jose Medina, a Copei former member of the Finance Committee, was also 
very influential in the implementation stage of the budget: 
 
“The military sector in Venezuela has carried great weight in the public credit. If you 
evaluate the programs financed in military matters, you will observe that the majority 
does not have support with regard to needs or demands. Hence, the impression that 
the regime does not offer many changes comes from the fact that the fight is against 
their intention to eliminate the controls that the executive had via the Congress” 
 
Venezuelan governments have implemented a symptomatic increase in the granting of supplementary 
budgets by making use of different strategies. One of the devices often resorted to public agencies was 
to deliberately spend their allocated funds before the end of a budgetary year and then return to 
Congress for additional funding. As Carmelo Lauría points out:  
 
“Here you do not authorize expenditures for corporations or museums and carry on 
just the same and not only that, including culture… there is a habit where they ask for 
funds and you do not provide these funds, the institutions keep their budgets 
convinced that the government owes them the same.”  
 
In conclusion, the analysis of this section indicates that supplementary budgets have been used 
routinely in the last thirty years as instruments to maintain the budgetary status quo and preserve the 
budget allocations of some important groups in the Venezuelan society as well as compensating those 
sectors for low levels of funding in the approval-stage process (Wlezien, 1993: 70). 
 
Other factors may also determine the need for supplemental allocations during the implementation 
stage, reflecting several political and economic influences. Inflation, for example, when higher than 
anticipated, may create the need for supplementary budgets for different programmes and items. 
Budget procedure evolves on the assumption that the purchasing power of money will remain stable; 
however, if the rate at which prices rise is uncertain, supplemental funds may be needed. In particular, 
after 1983 following the first devaluation inflation appeared as a phenomenon in the Venezuelan 
economy, leading to the difficulty of making reliable projections. Inflation affects both expenditures 
and revenues and makes inapplicable some traditional methods of forecasting and control. 
Governments, moreover, are reluctant to publicise their best guesses about the future rate of inflation 
because they do not want to open themselves up to criticism and because such official forecasts may 
become partially self-fulfilling prophecies. At the same time, uncertainty about likely price levels can 
"excuse" and thereby perpetuate a lax attitude to budget preparation: when the budget is subsequently 
executed, the results may also include wasted administrative efforts spent switching resources from 
one budget line to another; loss of macroeconomic control over the total; poor allocation of resources 
among programmes; expenditure arrears and a fundamentally excessive use of supplementary budgets. 
Thus, the formulation and execution of government budgets is greatly complicated by inflation. When 
                                                 
37 Despite not being a powerful sector in the overall allocation of public resources agriculture sector was very influential in 
the allocation of supplementary budgets especially during the 1970s.    52
inflation is unexpectedly high, the automatic cost of living adjustment across a range of programmes 
increases benefits. To the extent that transfers from other accounts or insubsistencias cannot absorb 
those costs, supplemental spending may be required
38. 
 
Moreover, many Venezuelan governments have attempted to provide economic stimulus during 
recession periods through supplementary budgets
39. For example, Luis Herrera Campíns (Copei) faced 
an especially difficult situation because his was the first government to suffer the consequences of 
negative economic growth and inflation after an initial reprieve of the 1980 oil boom. In addition, he 
confronted persistent opposition from Acción Democrática dominated Confederation of Venezuelan 
Workers (CTV), as well as from a divided Congress that his party did not control. To cope with these 
pressures, President Herrera pushed government spending to new heights, despite his repeated 
promises to rein in expenditures, and he resorted to further foreign borrowing (Karl, 1994: 44). This 
factor explains in high proportion the difference between the budget law and the executed budget for 
the years 1980 and 1981 (27.9% and 24.2% respectively). Similarly, in 1989 in the Carlos Andrés Pérez 
government, in the middle of the economic adjustment process and the associated recession, all the 
incentives for the Government to stimulate aggregate demand and the economy through public 
expenditure were also created. President Pérez’s economic stimulus programmes are another example 
of how supplementary budgets can be used. The 139.000 million bolivars in supplementary funding 
contained in that legislation was partially justified in a government that was looking for economic 
stimulus in a year of huge economic contraction. Likewise, the period of Jaime Lusinchi was 
characterised by the intention of this government to create an illusion of harmony in the economy, 
and the economic stimulus that supplementary budgets created was one of the strategies used. 
Furthermore, the Gulf War in 1989 spurred high expectations concerning the level of fiscal revenues, 
making it even more difficult for the Carlos Andrés Pérez government to impose a greater level of 
austerity in its public finances and its level of supplementary budgets.  
 
In the same way the very politically rewarded annual increases in the salaries of government employees 
have been in many cases financed by supplementary budgets. These increases have been usually 
announced by Presidents in May (Workers Day), and follow recommendations from the Ministry of 
Labour. Finance Ministries and OCEPRE’s directors have many times taken the lead in arguing that 
recommendations should not be implemented in full; however, again their positions have been 
considerably weakened in the years when it was possible to provide large supplementary budgets.  
 
It is clear that in the Venezuelan case the spending-control problem stems in an important proportion 
from the use of supplemental funding. Unpenalised overspending and subsequent requests for 
additional appropriations have undermined budget constraints. The binding ceilings in the budget 
must always be raised in order to accommodate the multiple supplementary budgets requested, 
disrupting the discipline of the budget process. Thus, the routine use of supplementary budgets has 
                                                 
38 The Congress and the Executive traditionally sought to offset new supplementary budget funding by rescinding amounts 
of unspent funding in other areas of the budget. Rescissions could reduce the budgetary impact of discretionary 
supplemental allocations. For example, in 1995 the level of “insubsistencias” was almost equal to the new approved 
supplementary budgets. However, data on the estimated amounts of rescinded for the period 1973-2004 suggest that in 
only two years (1975 and 1995) did the rescissions offset the level of supplementary budgets decreed during that period. 
For the other years between 1973 and 2004, these rescissions did not produce high enough outlay savings to fully offset 
the supplementary spending. 
39 After deficit financing became possible, this economic stimulation was provided in many cases by increasing the bond 
sale above the estimates in the initial budget. In some years, more than 60% of the total supplementary budget was 
financed with public debt.   53
contributed to the erosion of budgetary discipline and congressional fiscal controls and has pushed up 
spending. 
 
The high number and level of supplementary budgets approved during the period 1973-2004 have 
been an important source of fiscal indiscipline and a source of power of specific interest groups in the 
Executive-Congress budget decision process. In particular, the analysis in this study indicates that 
supplemental funds have been routinely used as instruments to maintain the budgetary status quo and 
preserve the budget allocations of some important groups in the Venezuelan society, as well as 
compensating those sectors for low levels of funding in the approval stage process. Therefore, a 
review of budget patterns indicates that actual spending was largely at variance with budget priorities 
established in the original budget law approved at the beginning of every year, contributing 
substantially to the fragmentation of the budgetary process and the weakening of spending control 
and fiscal discipline. 
 
The Venezuelan experience shows that ensuring that government’s budget proposals reflect prudent 
fiscal behaviour and clear objectives is not particularly useful if Congress can modify the size or the 
composition of the budget with relative ease, or if at the implementation stage the discretionary 
margins are such that systematic divergences emerge between ex-ante budgeted expenditures and ex-
post actual ones. In fact, the empirical evidence has shown that the un-penalised overspending and 
subsequent requests for additional resources have strongly undermined the hardness of budget 
constraint. Budget laws have not been very binding on some expenditure, and changes in the 
composition of spending have been carried out relatively easily. This has resulted in soft budget 
constraints, especially for some areas of spending, and in almost constant bargaining over the budget. 
 
Executive and Legislative interaction coefficients 
Additional evidence about the patterns the Executive and legislative interaction in the budget making 
process can be shown. Following the methodology of Abuelafia et al., 2005 this sub-section estimates 
the relative magnitude of changes in spending composition introduced in different stages of the 
budget process. The following coefficients were calculated:  
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Bi: is the participation of item i in total spending presented in the Executive budget proposal. 
Li: is the participation of item i in total spending approved in the budget law. 
Vi: is the participation of item i in the total of effective credit.   54
Di: is the participation of item i in the total of executed expenditure. 
 
The coefficients CBL and CLV represent the yearly changes in the composition of spending in the 
approval and execution phases respectively.  CVD on the other hand is a crude indicator of budget 
efficiency, since it measures the extent to which planned expenditures are actually executed. 
The results for the coefficients are presented in Figure 4 and in 5. Only in four years (1984, 1986, 1991 
and 1997) does Congress play a more important role than the Executive in defining budget outcomes. 
This is once again consistent with the argument that the Executive branch is the leading actor in the 
budget-making process, however budget allocations and particularly budget reallocations are also the 
product of legislators’ power. 
As shown above, important negotiations do go on in Congress, even if most of the action occurs at 
the Executive level. Ministers, public managers and interest groups who failed to include their budget 
needs in the planning phase in many cases influence reallocations in the approval and implementation 
phase of the budget. Furthermore, legislators attempt to increase pork for their districts and groups or 
sectors of interest.  
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
Equally, consistent with the analysis already made in this paper, the coefficients presented serves to 
identify two different patterns of congressional activity in the period 1973-2004: two periods (1973-
1983 and 1999-2004) characterised by a relatively low level of congressional involvement and a clear 
power of the Executive in the budget-making process. A third period (1984-1998) characterised by a 
high level of Congressional involvement with a more balanced sharing of power between the two 
main actor, including four years where even the Congress play relatively a more important role than 
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Figure 5. Changes in the composition of spending by stage (efficiency in execution).  
1973-2004 
Source: Authors’ own calculation 
 
Following Jones (2001), it is important to mention that the fact Congress does not make significant 
changes in the budget in some years is not sufficient evidence of a weak role. It could be that 
legislators negotiate with the Executive in the implementation phase of the budget or that the 
Executive tailors its proposal to fit the preferences of Congress so as to ensure its approval (Abuelafia, 
et al., 2005). 
VI.  Econometric Evidence 
 
Previous section stated the evolution of the relative strength between the Executive branch and the 
Congress. The aim of this section is fundamentally to address the question of how this relative 
strength between the Executive and Congress, controlling by some other variables, affects the fiscal 
performance of Venezuela. 
 
In order to measure fiscal performance, the variables selected are both, primary and total balance as a 
share of GDP. In particular, primary balance allows controlling the effect of previous deficits on 
current fiscal balance. This is very relevant in a country such as Venezuela in which high debt levels is 
a structural characteristic of the public finances (Garcia, et al, 1997; Puente; 2004 and Rios, 2003). 
 
The independent variables are: i) the effect of Executive and Congress relative power on fiscal 
performance. The control variables are: i) constrains imposed by oil income, ii) the possibility that 
policy makers respond to electoral events, meaning the existence of a “political budget cycle” (Shi & 
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The proposed model, originally estimated by OLS is
40: 
 





FP:   Fiscal performance.  
OFI:   Total fiscal income 
Elec:   Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for each electoral year and zero otherwise 
Exec:   Relative power the Executive branch has in the budget allocations process.  
Leg:   Relative power that the Legislative has in the budget allocations process 
Adjust: Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for each year in which a macroeconomic 
adjustment program has been implemented. 
 
Findings 
The main findings from the regression (table 10) are the following: 
 
A relative stronger Executive power is positively associated with a better fiscal performance 
As was pointed out in a previous section (Executive and Legislative interaction coefficients), in the 
majority of years under the period studied, Executive branch in Venezuela has displayed a relative 
higher degree of power in the budget reallocation process.  
According to the results shown in Table 10, one per cent increase in the Executive power index is 
linear and positively associated with an average improvement of 0.2% in the primary balance and 
0.29% in the global fiscal balance.  
This evidence is consistent with the result of previous studies for industrialized countries (Alesina et 
al. 1997; Alesina and Perotti 1995; Roubini and Sachs, 1989) as well as for Latin American nations 
(Amorin Nieto and Borsani; 2003). All these works have found that the greater the power of the 
Executive the lower the level of fiscal deficits.  
The relative power of Congress in the budget reallocation process is correlated with a worse fiscal result.   
Consistent with the previous section, during the period between 1984 and 1999, the relative power of 
the Venezuelan Congress increased. In fact, during this period, the number of reallocations carried out 
by congressmen shows a significant growth.   
                                                 
40 A robust estimation was used, which consists in computing the Huber-White variance-covariance matrix. As this 
procedure is a particular case of generalized least squared, the reader must remember that typical R2 is only full valid as a 
measure of model fitness in the ordinary least squared method (Davidson and MacKinnon; 2003).  
41 The econometric evidence in this study follows a standard approach with a proposed linear specification. Regressions in 
which both the dependent and the explanatory variables have no unit roots are run in order to avoid the classical problem 
created by the use of non-stationary variables and the possibility of incurring in spurious regression.  
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According to the model, a relative increase in congressional power in the budget reallocation process 
has had a negative impact on the fiscal balance. Actually, the results suggest that a greater coefficient 
(1%) is associated with an increase in the average primary deficit of 0.5% and 0.6% in case of the 
global deficit. 
 
Table 10.  Political and Economic determinants of the Venezuela’s fiscal performance 
(1973-2004)
a 
  Period  under study 1973-2004 
  Dependent variables 
  Primary balance  Total fiscal balance 



























2 R : 
0.56 0.57 
a The information in brackets is the T-statistic 
* Statistical significance to the level of 1% 
** Statistical significance to the level of 5% 
*** Statistical significance to the level of 10% 
Unexpected oil fiscal income has a significant effect on fiscal performance.  
The first control variable included in the model shows that oil shocks or unexpected increases have a 
significant impact on the fiscal balance. It was found that, in both, primary and global fiscal balance, 
an unexpected increase of one billion dollars improves the fiscal performance on 0.575% of GDP. 





                                                 
42 Fiscal performance was computed in units (meaning that 5.75% was introduced as 0.0575), total exports were measured 
in millions of current dollars, and Executive and Legislative power index calculated based on Abuelafia, et al (2005), were 
introduced in units as well. This is relevant just for reading the coefficient of some variables, but also to facilitate the 
explanations of the results in this section.
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Figure 6. Relationship between total unexpected exports (as a proxy of unexpected oil fiscal 
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Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
 
There evidence that support the political budget cycle 
Evidence was found that supports the existence of a political budget cycle in Venezuela. Based on the 
results, on average each presidential election year is negatively associated with the fiscal performance.  
The results suggest that on average, fiscal performance is worse, around (2.5% - 3.0%), as a share of 
the GDP (See table 10)
43 
 
Macroeconomic adjustment programmes have an effect on fiscal balance.   
Finally, a second dummy variable was included to capture the effect that the implementation of a 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes has on fiscal performance
44. The model indicates that 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes improves, on average, primary balance around 2.9% and 







                                                 
43 The 1968 election was use as the base year. 
44 Even though, there are several episodes of macroeconomic adjustments (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 1996 and 2002) only 
those associated with financial international organizations, and in particular with IMF, were taken into account. That is 
reason why only 1989 and 1996 where chosen as years of macroeconomic adjustment programmes.    59
 
Box. 3. Methodological issues 
This box discusses some of the reason behind the selection of a specific proxy variable for the oil 
fiscal income, as well as other economic variables in the econometric model. 
On the explanatory variables side, several economic variables were implemented as controls. In 
particular, a regression was run with the inflation rate, oil price, total exports and unemployment rate. 
Inflation and unemployment rates were disregarded due to statistical meaningless.  
Also, oil price was discarded because its inclusion as a proxy of fiscal income implied a source of 
endogeneity. In fact, oil fiscal income is composed by the price and the amount of barrels exported. 
During some periods, prices are highly correlated with the amount of barrels exported by Venezuela 
(particularly, during the 1980s and the mid-1990s).  
In this sense, if a regression is run in which oil fiscal income is an explanatory variable and only oil 
price is included as a proxy of fiscal oil income, endogeneity is introduced in that regression, because 
oil price (explanatory variable) will be correlated with the perturbation term (in which the amount of 
barrels would be present). 
Having discarded other controls, total exports were chosen as a proxy of fiscal income.
45 Once 
selected this variable, included only its cyclical component is included for both econometric and 
economic reasons. On the economics side, under rational expectations what causes real effects in the 
fiscal result are unexpected changes on variables. Following a standard procedure in the literature, the 
expected component was approximated applying the Hodrick - Prescott filter to the levels of the 
original variables and then the cyclical (unexpected) component was computed as the deviation of the 
original variable from the expected component. 
On the econometrics side, the cyclical component of the total exports is stationary which avoids the 




The main conclusions of this study are:  
Firstly, from the general policymaking as well as budget-making perspective, three distinctive sub-
periods within the years 1974-2004 were identified from both a qualitative as well as quantitative 
approach, displaying the following main characteristics:  
First Period (1974-1988) - Strong Presidential power within a cooperative system strongly 
influenced by a corporative arrangement in a limited political competitive context.  
Second Period (1989-1998) - Weakened Presidential power and stronger Congress within a 
non-cooperative system and a fragmented political context.  
Third Period (1999-2004) - Constitutional and informally powerful President with no political 
competition.  
                                                 
45 Total oil exports would have been a more accurate proxy variable. Unfortunately it is only available since 1989.    60
Secondly, in general the Executive branch has been the leading actor in the budget-making process. 
The Executive has a number of bargaining advantages over Congress during the process. However, 
budget allocations have also been the product of legislators' pursuit of (re) election and power, as well 
as the demand of interest groups.  
In particular, Congress has altered the overall composition of spending proposed by the Executive in 
the approval stage of the budget. Cross-sectional variations in congressional activity support the view 
that legislature increases in the Executive’s budget were concentrated in a group of public offices and 
ministries. One may conclude from these results that congressional activity and, inferentially, 
congressional interest was concentrated in those sectors. Certain budget categories appeared to attract 
more congressional interest than others. Thus, the Legislative, even without altering the overall 
spending levels, pressed for redistribution of appropriations across programmes, areas and public 
offices benefiting specific interest groups. 
Likewise, the high number and level of supplementary budgets approved during the period 1973-2004 
have been an important source of fiscal indiscipline and a source of power of specific interest groups 
in the Executive-Congress budget decision process. In particular, the evidence indicates that 
supplemental funds have been routinely used as instruments to maintain the budgetary status quo and 
preserve the budget allocations of some important groups in the Venezuelan society, as well as 
compensating those sectors for low levels of funding in the approval stage process. Therefore, a 
review of budget patterns indicates that actual spending was largely at variance with budget priorities 
established in the original budget law approved at the beginning of every year, contributing 
substantially to the fragmentation of the budgetary process and the weakening of spending control 
and fiscal discipline. 
Thirdly, besides fundamental economic variables, such as oil income, macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes; it is found that political variables such as electoral year, the power of the Executive vis-à-
vis Legislative among others, are important determinants of budget (re) allocations and fiscal 
performance. In particular, the main findings from the econometric work about the main political and 
economic determinants of fiscal performance are the following:  
(1) A relative stronger Executive power is positively associated with a better fiscal 
performance.  
(2) The relative power of Congress in the budget reallocation process is correlated with a 
worse fiscal result. Therefore, this trade-off between representativeness and sustainability 
could be assumed as one of the intrinsic costs of democracy. 
(3) Unexpected oil fiscal income has a significant effect on fiscal performance.  
(4) On average each presidential election year is negatively associated with the fiscal 
performance. 
 (5) Macroeconomic adjustment programmes have an effect on fiscal balance.  
Fourthly, as has been shown by the political economy literature, political institutions affect the 'rules 
of the game' under which different actors interact, by placing constraints on the whole budgetary 
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Annex 1. The Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund 
 
In November of 1998, the government approved a Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund (Fondo de 
Estabilización Macroeconómica or FEM) with the objective of smoothing out the effects of oil export 
price fluctuations on public finances. The rules of the FEM apply to PDVSA, the central government 
and local administrations. This mechanism intends to be a sort of “black box” where unexpected oil 
windfall are saved and used during periods when fiscal oil revenues are low or below estimates, 
therefore preventing a pro-cyclical fiscal policy. However, since its creation, the FEM has been 
modified several times to allow investment in government projects and more recently to stop saving 
during oil booms. Of course, this changes has altered substantially the spirit of this fiscal rule, making 
it basically useless.             
 
During the oil boom of the 70s, during the first Carlos Andrés Pérez’s government a similar 
mechanism called FIV (Fondo de Inversiones de Venezuela) was implemented, but its main objective 
was to invest the oil windfall in projects and public enterprises of national interest. At the beginning of 
the 90s, during the second government of Carlos Andrés Perez, an oil contingency fund was designed 
and presented to Congress for approval. The decision to create the fund was approve by the 
Economic Cabinet in October 1991, but it was not approve by Congress when it was submitted as 
part of the new budget law in October 1992. The main reason behind this was that the FEM law was 
presented together with a new central bank chapter and during the political negotiations between 
congress and the executive, they agreed to pass the central bank law but not the FEM. Additionally, 
legislators at the time were not convinced of the necessity of saving excess oil revenues. It is 
interesting to notice that the FEM law approved by Congress in 1998 was during a period of low oil 
prices which made it easier for legislators to pass the law because they did not foresee any significant 
accumulations in the near future. 
 
It is illustrative of the lack and weaknesses of fiscal rules in Venezuela to describe the evolution and 
modifications of the FEM since its creation in 1998. Originally, the FEM was supposed to operate on 
an automatic basis. Oil windfalls or shortfalls were determined comparing current oil revenues with a 
reference value calculated as a five years moving average of oil revenues. Resources could be 
withdrawn only for debt amortizations if oil revenues in a given year felt below the reference value or 
if resources in the FEM exceeded eighty percent of the five year moving average of oil export 
revenues. FEM resources are administrated in a similar fashion to the international reserves of the 
central bank and are maintained abroad. Funds withdrawn from the FEM are sold to the central bank 
and deposited in local currency in the accounts of the respective public sector entity (central 
government, local governments or PDVSA).     
 
In 1999 a fixed reference value of $9 per barrel was established, setting the resources to be deposited 
in the FEM at 50% of the excess over the reference value. This modification also allowed the 
President to withdraw funds with Congress authorization. However, the rules for adding resources to 
the fund were never issued, which undermined the mechanism due to lack of transparency and 
uncertainty about the norms governing the fund operations. In 2001 a new modification to the law 
exempted the central government and PDVSA from depositing in the FEM in the last three months 
of 2001 and all 2002. Later that year another reform of the law also exempted these entities from 
adding funds to the FEM during 2003. 
 
In 2003 Congress modified the rules of resources accumulation of the FEM. Contributions to the 
fund are supposed to be made when oil revenues are above a three year average. Similarly to the 
original law, 50% of the excess over the reference value should be deposited in the FEM. These   67
changes also established that the central government and PDVSA were exempted from depositing in 
the fund during 2004. Clearly the rules of the FEM have not been implemented consistently and 
successive changes have eroded the stabilization power of the fiscal rule. This has caused lost of 




Annex 2  
Representation in Congress (1974-2004)
Government 
Party




Seats in the 
Chamber of 
Deputies
AD COPEI Causa R Conv MAS MVR PV FJAC 
(AD,COPEI, 
PV,PJ)
Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) 1974-1979 AD 49% 51% Gov Party 32% - - - - - -
Luis Herrara Campíns (COPEI) 1979-1984 COPEI 45% 42% 42% Gov Party - - - - - -
Jaime Lusinchi (AD) 1984-1989 AD 55% 56% Gov Party 30% - - - - - -
Carlos Andrés Pérez (AD) 1989-1992 AD 53% 48% Gov Party 33% - - - - - -
Rafael Caldera (Convergencia) 1994-1999 Convergencia 17% + Coalition 13% + Coalition 27% 26% 20% Gov Party 11% - - -
Hugo Chavez (MVR) 1998-2000 MVR 40% 22% 30% 14% - - 8% Gov Party 10% -
Hugo Chavez (MVR) 2000-2005 MVR 48% 56% - - - - 4% Gov Party - 30%
Source: CNE and own calculations
Parties in Remaining Seats in Congress
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 